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I. INTRODUCTION

[In late 1981, Public Citizen Health Research Group
(Public Citizen) was engaged in litigation with the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) over the adequacy of the agency's standards
for workplace exposure to a widely-used mutagenic
Over the course of the
chemical, ethylene oxide.
lawsuit, Public Citizen had obtained numerous
documents from OSHA, but the agency had withheld
one potentially important internal memorandum.
Public Citizen filed a motion to compel release, but a
few days later, that motion proved unnecessary. The
group's lead litigator] got to work early and found a
manila envelope on [his] desk, with no postage, no
return address, and no markings, other than [his]
[He] thought it might be an
name, misspelled....
early Christmas present. Curious, [he] opened the
envelope and found a present of a different sort-a
copy of the... memo, or something that met its
description. No cover letter, no card, just the memo.
[He] read the memo, and then.., read it again. It was
dynamite.'
People talk. In the administrative law context, this means that
Virtually every
agencies have trouble keeping secrets. 2
administrative lawyer, agency professional, and government
journalist has a story to tell--of privileged documents like the
OSHA memorandum, which somehow find their way into opposing
1 David C. Vladeck, Delay, UnreasonableIntervention: The Battle to Force Regulation of
Ethylene Oxide, in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW STORIES 191, 191-92, 199-200 (Peter L. Strauss
ed., 2006).
2 See, e.g., Linton Weeks, In Washington, Leaking as a Way of Life, NAT'L PUB. RADIO
(June 15, 2012, 12:34 PM), http://www.npr.org/2012/O6/15/155068581/in-washingtonleaking-as-a-way-of-life?sc=17&f=-1001 (discussing the prevalence of leaks in Washington);
Max Frankel, The Washington Back Channel, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2007, at E42 ("[Tihe
ultimate secret about secrets in Washington [is] that practically everything that our
government does, plans, thinks, hears and contemplates in the realms of foreign policy is
stamped and treated as secret - and then unraveled by that same government, by the
Congress and by the press in one continuing round of professional and social contacts and
cooperative and competitive exchanges of information." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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3
counsel's hands at a key moment in the lead-up to litigation; of
newspaper articles that discuss formerly secret agency personnel
changes, 4 or cite anonymous insiders who question whether their
5 of
agency is adequately staffed to fulfill its mandate;
congressional oversight hearings at which the questioners plainly
had access to background documents that senior agency
administrators had chosen not to share with Congress. 6 The
overall volume of information flow is so large that 'Washington
insiders have the sense of participating in a 'government by
leak.' "7 Indeed, some twenty-five years ago, "42% of the federal
officials responding to a survey stated that they had leaked
' 8'
[information] during their government careers.
Considered individually, many of these leaks appear
unimportant-just an agency employee's attempt to score
professional (or social) points by sharing inside-the-Beltway
gossip. 9 If the leak evinces no criminal or otherwise serious
misconduct by agency officials, the source can expect no protection
from the Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA)1 ° or state
3 Vladeck, supra note 1, at 200.

1 See, e.g., Richard A. Serrano & Kim Murphy, ATE Director to Resign, Agency Sources
Say, L.A. TIMES, June 21, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jun/21/nation/la-na-atf-201
10621 (discussing leaks related to the resignation of the director of the ATF following the
agency's controversial Fast and Furious operation).
5 See, e.g., Ryan Witt, Exclusive: Inside Source Claims FEMA Understaffed for Future
Disasters,EXAMINER.COM, June 14, 2011, http://www.examiner.com/article/exclusive-insidesource-claims-fema-understaffed-for-future-disasters (noting that an inside source at FEMA
claims the agency is "ill-prepared to deal with future disaste[r] [due to a] 'desperate
shortage of qualified staff ").
6 Interview with Marshall J. Breger, Professor, Catholic University Columbus School of
Law (June 22, 2011) (discussing Professor Breger's time as Solicitor of Labor during the
George H.W. Bush Administration).
7 Lili Levi, Dangerous Liaisons: Seduction and Betrayal in Confidential Press-Source
Relations, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 609, 622 (1991); see also, e.g., Weeks, supra note 2 (noting
that leaking is a "way of life" in Washington); Frankel, supra note 2 ("Mhe ultimate secret
about secrets in Washington [is] that practically everything that our government does,
plans, thinks, hears and contemplates in the realms of foreign policy is stamped and treated
as secret - and then unraveled by that same government, by the Congress and by the press
in one continuing round of professional and social contacts and cooperative and competitive
exchanges of information." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
8 Levi, supra note 7, at 623-24 n.43 (citing MARTIN LINSKY, IMPACT: HOW THE PRESS
AFFECTS FEDERAL POLICYMAKING 172 (1986)).
9 This Article focuses on the implications of soft whistleblowing for federal agency
operations, but state governments almost certainly house their share of soft whistleblowers
as well.
10 5 U.S.C. § 1213(a)(1) (2012).
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whistleblower laws. He could, therefore, be disciplined or fired for
his loose tongue if his disclosure came to light.1 1 On the other
hand, the employee likely breaks no law in passing on this kind of
information, 12 provided that none of the information relates to
national security 3 or trade secrets,1 4 or violates the Anti-Lobbying
Act. 15
If the laws governing the conduct of agency employees neither
protect nor condemn most of these disclosures, why should
administrative law scholars care about the activity? As this Article
explains, deliberately leaking information that is policy-relevant but
evinces no agency malfeasance-a practice this Article dubs "soft
whistleblowin'--enables individual agency employees who
disagree with their agency's policy choices to use their expertise and
inside information to generate outside pressure on their agency to
shift direction.1 6 The soft whistleblowers' disclosures can influence

11 Id. § 2302(b)(8). Most other whistleblower protection statutes, too, protect only the
disclosure of illegal acts or comparably gross misconduct. Terry Morehead Dworkin, SOX
and Whistleblowing, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1757, 1760 n.15 (2007) (citing MARCIA P. MICELI &
JANET P. NEAR, BLOWING THE WHISTLE 260-73 tbl.6-2 (1992)).
12 The employee may, however, violate government ethics rules.
See 5 C.F.R.
§ 2635.704(a) (2012) ("An employee has a duty to protect and conserve Government property
and shall not use such property, or allow its use, for other than authorized purposes."); id.
§ 2635.705(a) ("Unless authorized in accordance with law or regulations to use such time for
other purposes, an employee shall use official time in an honest effort to perform official
duties.").
13 See generally 18 U.S.C. §§ 793-798 (2012) (protecting information related to the
national defense); National Security Act of 1947 § 606, 50 U.S.C. § 426(1) (2012) (defining
"classified information"). But cf. William E. Lee, Deep Background: Journalists,Sources
and the Perils of Leaking, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1453, 1477, 1529 (2008) (noting that as of 2008,
"[o]nly three cases ha[d] been brought under the Espionage Act against those in positions of
trust who leaked information to the press").
14 Trade Secret Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (2012) (making it a crime for government employees
to disclose trade secret information); Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4)
(2012) (exempting trade secret information from Freedom of Information Act disclosure
requirements).
15 18 U.S.C. § 1913 (2012) (prohibiting federal executive branch employees from "pay[ing]
for any personal service, advertisement, telegram, telephone, letter, printed or written
matter, or other device, intended or designed to influence in any manner a Member of
Congress, a jurisdiction, or an official of any government, to favor, adopt, or oppose, by vote
or otherwise, any legislation, law, ratification, policy, or appropriation, whether before or
after the introduction of any bill, measure, or resolution proposing such legislation, law,
ratification, policy, or appropriation").
16 Cf. DEENA WEINSTEIN, BUREAUCRATIC OPPOSITION: CHALLENGING ABUSES AT THE
WORKPLACE 2 (1979) (characterizing whistleblowing as an "attempt[] to change a
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the direction and efficacy of congressional, presidential, and judicial
oversight of agency activities, and also affect the agency's image in
the all-important court of public opinion. In other words, the fact of
soft whistleblowing, and its ubiquity, mean that agency insiders
play a substantial and, as of yet, largely unexamined role in shaping
the outside forces that keep "agency officials ...answerable to the
people for their decisions" and ensure that those decisions are
"rational and otherwise effective." 17
Soft whistleblowing is only one of many types of off-the-record
communication between agencies and outsiders. Thirty-six years
ago, in the context of reviewing a Federal Communications
Commission rule developed with considerable "ex parte" input
from interested outside parties, the D.C. Circuit observed that
"informal contacts between agencies and the public are the 'bread
and butter' of the process of administration and are completely
appropriate so long as they do not frustrate judicial review. ' 18 A
few years later, the same court revisited the issue in reviewing an
EPA pollution rule that had been the subject of both an alleged
"'ex parte blitz' by coal industry advocates" 19 and "numerous postcomment period meetings with personnel of other agencies,
members of Congress. . ., the President ...and representatives of
private interests."20 Again, the court refused to condemn the
various off-the-record communications, opining instead that "the
very legitimacy of [agency] policymaking ...depends in no small
part upon the openness, accessibility, and amenability of [agency]
officials to the needs and ideas of the public from whom their
bureaucracy by those who work within the organization but who do not have any
authority").
17 Lisa Schultz Bressman & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Inside the Administrative State: A
Critical Look at the Practice of PresidentialControl, 105 MICH. L. REV. 47, 52 (2006); see
also Daniel P. Carpenter & Keith E. Whittington, Executive Power in American
Institutional Development, 1 PERSPECTIVES ON POL. 495, 499-501 (2003) (analyzing how
former U.S. Department of Agriculture Chief Forester, Gifford Pinchot, used ties with
organized citizens and the press to engage in autonomous policy building). For more
information on the extensive use of outside influence for internal agency policy building in
the U.S. Department of Agriculture, see DANIEL P. CARPENTER, FORGING BUREAUCRATIC
AUTONOMY: REPUTATIONS, NETWORKS, AND POLICY INNOVATION IN EXECUTIVE AGENCIES,

1862-1928, at 179-325 (2001).
18 Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 53-57 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
19 Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 386 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
20 Jack M. Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 61, 132
(2006).
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ultimate authority derives, and upon whom their commands must
fall."21
Scholars have discussed the general category of back-channel
communications between agencies and interested outsiders. Jack
M. Beermann, for example, argues that "informal contacts"
between Congress and agencies are integral to congressional
oversight of the administrative state, with members of Congress
"attempt[ing] to influence the execution of the law by
communicating directly with agency personnel." 22 Thomas 0.
McGarity
discusses
off-the-record
conversations
between
"'informationally endowed stakeholders and agency staff,'"
stating that, in the current, highly partisan regulatory climate,
these parties "negotiate regulatory policies in the shadows, where
they are typically free of mandatory docket and recordkeeping
requirements." 23 He continues, "Shadow conversations are not
limited to technical staff and economists. High- and mid-level
officials at most agencies are also generally willing to meet with
lobbyists from beneficiary groups and affected industries [during]
rulemaking to receive information, hear legal and policy
arguments, and entertain suggestions for change." 24 Such off-therecord contacts are a familiar piece of the broader puzzle of agency
"capture"-the concern that well-organized or well-funded interest
groups have greater (formal and informal) input into the
25
regulatory process than other agency constituents.
To date, however, no one has given soft whistleblowing any
sustained attention. 26 Instead, the discussion of back-channel
Costle, 657 F.2d at 400-01.
Beermann, supranote 20, at 130.
23 Thomas 0. McGarity, Administrative Law as Blood Sport: Policy Erosion in a Highly
Partisan Age, 61 DUKE L.J. 1671, 1705 (2012) (quoting Wendy E. Wagner, Administrative
Law, Filter Failure,and Information Capture, 59 DUKE L.J. 1321, 1366 (2010)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
21
22

24

Id.

See generally, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967-1983, 72
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1039, 1050-52 (1997) (explaining capture theory); Richard B. Stewart,
The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1667, 1684-85 (1975)
(discussing various reasons, other than overt "capture," why one might generally expect
agencies to take a pro-industry stance).
26 Many administrative law scholars have begun to explore internal agency structure and
governance to explain broader themes of agency governance, legitimacy, and separation of
powers. See, e.g., Sidney Shapiro et al., The Enlightenment of Administrative Law: Looking
Inside the Agency for Legitimacy, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 463, 469-71 (2012) (discussing
25
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communications between agency employees and outsiders has
focused on four categories of information exchange: (1) traditional
or "hard" whistleblowing-that is, disclosures that concern
(alleged) agency wrongdoing; 27 (2) "inward" communications of the
sort that Beermann and McGarity principally discuss-nonpublic
information and policy recommendations that "ex parte" outsiders
bring to the agency;28 (3) "outward" leaks to the press, often of
national security information, and the "role [of such leaks] in
29
keeping the public informed about the operations of government";
and (4) the constitutional dimension-what First Amendment
protections (if any) are available to a government employee who
breaks the law by leaking, for example, national security
information, or to the journalist who rebroadcasts that information
30
to a larger audience.
the effects of "inside-out accountability" on agency legitimacy). None, however, has focused
on agency employees' instrumental policy leaks like those this Article discusses.
27 See infra Part II (discussing the difference between "hard" and "soft" whistleblowing);
see also, e.g., Mika C. Morse, Honor or Betrayal? The Ethics of Government LawyerWhistleblowers, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 421, 422-23 (2010) (discussing disclosures by
kgovernment lawyers); Cary Coglianese, Heather Kilmartin & Evan Mendelson,
Transparency and Public Participation in the Federal Rulemaking Process:
Recommendations for the New Administration, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 924, 944-45 (2009)
(recommending improved protections for government whistleblowers); cf. Robert G. Vaughn,
America's First Comprehensive Statute Protecting Corporate Whistleblowers, 57 ADMIN. L.
REV. 1, 26-28 (2005) (discussing the role of corporate whistleblowers in disclosing abuses by
government contractors).
28 Examples might include suggestions of names for key vacancies or rationales for
adopting or refusing to adopt a new rule. See Beermann, supra note 20, at 70 (discussing
informal supervision given by Congress to various agencies); McGarity, supra note 23, at
1745 (noting the incentive for companies and trade associations to flood agencies with
information and analysis during high-stakes rulemaking).
29 ELIE ABEL, LEAKING: WHO DOES IT? WHO BENEFITS? AT WHAT COST? 6 (1987); see also
Bruce Ackerman, Op-Ed, Protect, Don't Prosecute, Patriotic Leakers, N.Y. TIMES (June 12,
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/13/opinion/dont-prosecute-leakers-who-defend-ourconstitution.html (arguing that leaks regarding the executive's unconstitutional behavior in
the national security context actually promote national security "by preserving our
constitutional integrity).
30 See, e.g., Lee, supra note 13, at 1477, 1529 (noting the Supreme Court's refusal to
create a "First Amendment-based reporter privilege," but also remarking on the proper role
courts could play in protecting outsiders who receive leaks); Mark Gomsak, The Free Flow
of Information Act of 2006: Settling the Journalist'sPrivilege Debate, 45 BRANDEIS L.J. 597,
603-06 (2007) (discussing the need to recognize a journalist's privilege); Richard B.
Kielbowicz, The Role of News Leaks in Governance and the Law of Journalists'
Confidentiality, 1795-2005, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 425, 484 (2006) (commenting on the
Supreme Court's preferred use of the freedom theory under the First Amendment to strike
down governmental restraints on the press).
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It concerns not agency
Soft whistleblowing is different.
malfeasance but internal dissent about an agency's policy course.
Further, the study of soft whistleblowing focuses not on the role
that agency outsiders play in manipulating agency policy
development, via the ex parte communications that the D.C.
Circuit deemed "the 'bread and butter' of the process of
administration,"31 but on the surprisingly large role that senior,
mid-level, and even low-level agency insiders can play in
Specifically, soft
manipulating that same development.
whistleblowing enables agency insiders to use their inside
information, their expertise, and their connections with outsiders
both to shift the balance of power at their employer agencies and
to change the tenor and outcome of agency policy discussions.
Moreover, the prevalence of soft whistleblowing means that
considerable non-public, policy-relevant information flows from
agency employees to journalists, public watchdog groups,
congressional staff, and even staff at other agencies. This highvolume flow of information has profound consequences for the
central conundrums of administrative law: agency governance,
and
regulatory policy,
of sound
development
efficient
32
state.
administrative
the
of
control
constitutional
Because soft whistleblowing is new to the literature, Part II
begins by defining the term and explaining the distinctions
between these sources' disclosures and conventional or "hard"
whistleblowing. Part III is similarly descriptive. To illustrate and
analyze the soft whistleblowing phenomenon, Part III provides
three case studies: the role of soft whistleblowers in the formation
of the National Organization for Women (NOW); the effectiveness
of soft whistleblowing in Public Citizen's litigation campaign to
force OSHA to strengthen its regulation of ethylene oxide; and the
saga of the Department of Justice Civil Rights Division's
controversial 2009 voter-intimidation lawsuit against members of
the New Black Panther Party. Part III also details the findings
from a series of interviews conducted with Capitol Hill staffers,
environmental lobbyists (on both sides of -the aisle), and
journalists, each of whom has received and acted on information

31 Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 53-57 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
32

See discussion infra Part IV.
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from a soft whistleblower at one of the environmental agencies.
This background provides material for a taxonomy of common
modes and consequences of soft whistleblowing.
Part IV then explores the implications of soft whistleblowing for
agency policy development, for congressional, presidential, and
judicial oversight of agency activities, and for agencies' public
image. As Part IV explains, our understanding of the forces that
help to ensure sound policy development, and that keep agencies
in check, is significantly underdeveloped in two key ways. First,
contributors to the literature on administrative policymaking have
tended to treat agencies as "unitary entities" 33-hives whose busy
employees' task is to serve the agency and, in so doing, to speak
with one public voice. Soft whistleblowing illustrates that such an
understanding is at best incomplete: agency insiders regularly (if
softly) express their dissent to outsiders who may be in a position
to help the insiders effect change. Moreover, soft whistleblowing
affects the power dynamic within an agency, because stark
differences among professional ethics rules mean that some agency
professionals (notably engineers) are likely to be more willing than
others (notably lawyers) to wield their inside information in this
way.
A second deficiency in the existing literature is the failure to
appreciate the important role that even mid- and low-level agency
insiders can play in facilitating and directing--or in some cases
thwarting--congressional, presidential, judicial, and public
oversight of their employer agencies. As this Article explains, soft
whistleblowers' disclosures tend to improve agency transparency
and augment congressional oversight. On the other hand, these
increases in agency accountability may come at considerable

33 Elizabeth Magill & Adrian Vermeule, Allocating Power Within Agencies, 120 YALE
L.J. 1032, 1035 (2011). Recently a few authors have begun to look inside the hive. See, e.g.,
id. at 1035 (discussing how power is allocated 'both horizontally and vertically within
agencies"); Rebecca Ingber, Interpretation Catalysts and Executive Branch Legal
Decisionmaking, 38 YALE J. INT'L L. 359, 360-61 (2013) (discussing a variety of triggering
events, or "interpretation catalysts," that shape the executive decisionmaking process);
Gillian Metzger, The Interdependent Relationship Between Internal and External
Separation of Powers, 59 EMORY L.J. 423, 454 (2009) (noting that internal constraints on
executive power may undermine political accountability and the unitary structure of the
executive).
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expense to what
34
administration."

has

come to be known as

435

"presidential

II. DEFINING THE CONCEPT: WHAT SOFT WHISTLEBLOWING IS, AND
WHAT IT ISN'T
To explore the implications of soft whistleblowing for agency
governance and accountability, it is first necessary to define the
term. Many agency leaks (particularly those that make the front
pages of national newspapers) 35 fit the traditional understanding
of "whistleblowing." While there is no universal definition of that
term, it is generally understood to refer to " 'the disclosure by
organization members (former or current) of illegal, immoral, or
illegitimate practices under the control of their employers to
persons or organizations that may be able to effect action.'"36 The
WPA 37 suggests an alternative, narrower definition: the
"disclosure of information ...which the employee reasonably
believes evidences-(i) any violation of any law, rule, or regulation,
or (ii) gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of
authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health or
For its part, the House Ethics Manual encourages
safety."38
government employees to disclose evidence of "corruption
wherever discovered."39 The unifying feature of these various
definitions is their focus on the disclosure of misconduct or
practices,"
immoral,
or illegitimate
malfeasance-"illegal,
violations of laws or rules, gross mismanagement, waste, or
corruption. These kinds of disclosures have important and well-

34 Elena Kagan, PresidentialAdministration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2246 (2001).
35 See, e.g., Seth Cline, Leaked Memo Outlines Policy for Killing Americans With Drones,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 5, 2013, http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/02/05/
leaked-memo-outlines-policy-for-killing-americans-with-drones (discussing a well-publicized
leak regarding drone strikes).
36 Dworkin, supra note 11, at 1760 (quoting MARCIA P. MICELI & JANET P. NEAR,
BLOWING THE WHISTLE 15 (1992)).
37 Pub. L. No. 101-12, 103 Stat. 16 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
38 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) (2012).
39 Code of Ethics for Government Service, 72 Stat., Part 2, B12 (1958), H. Con. Res. 175,
85th Cong. (passed July 11, 1958), as reprinted in HOUSE ETHICS MANUAL 355 (2008).
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explored implications for agency function and democratic
40
accountability.
I focus on a very different kind of disclosure that is subtler,
more ubiquitous, and even more consequential for agencies: lowlevel, mid-level, and even senior employees' disclosure of inside
information about decisions, policies, or practices that are
presumptively legal and moral, but are nonetheless open to debate
or controversy. "Soft whistleblowing" thus refers to an agency
employee's deliberate, unsanctioned,substantive, and instrumental
disclosure of non-public and policy-relevant information, in the
41
absence of evidence of malfeasance.
To put the distinction in more general terms, traditional or
hard whistleblowing often involves leaked evidence, or at least
42
Soft
allegations, of a legal or ethical lapse at an agency.
whistleblowing, by contrast, refers to disclosures about agency
actions that may seem arbitrary or ill-advised but are neither
illegal nor immoral-for example, an agency's adoption of a policy
that, in the soft whistleblower's view, lacks scientific support or
exceeds (or falls impermissibly short of) the agency's statutory
mandate. The narratives in Part III provide concrete examples.
The line between "hard" and "soft" whistleblowing may sometimes
be difficult to draw, of course, because "illegal" and "immoral" can
be imprecise terms. That said, the fact that some leaks cannot
40 See generally, e.g., Kathleen Clark, Government Lawyers and Confidentiality Norms,
85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1033, 1073-91 (2007) (discussing the scope of government lawyers'
confidentiality obligations); Rosalie Berger Levinson, Silencing Government Employee
Whistleblowers in the Name of "Efficiency," 23 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 17, 18 (1996) ("A basic
tension exists between the government's right to operate effectively and efficiently and the
right of some 18 million federal, state and local government employees to disclose what they
perceive is government wrongdoing, graft, corruption, or simply inefficiency."); Morse, supra
note 27, at 422-23 (discussing the "imbalance" between (1) the "basic tenet[s] that an
informed public is essential to a functioning democracy [and that] leaks are an essential
part of informing the public" and (2) the fact that "the leaker herself is still subject to
sanction"); James L. Perry, Whistleblowing, Organizational Performance, and
Organizational Control, in ETHICS & PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 79, 82, 86 (H. George
Frederickson ed., 1993) (discussing the "organizational consequences of whistleblowing,"
and surveying whistleblowing cases from federal government agencies).
41 See Levi, supra note 7, at 628-30 (discussing "plants" and "trial balloon leaks"); see
also, e.g., Mary-Rose Papandrea, Lapdogs, Watchdogs, and Scapegoats: The Press and
National Security Information, 83 IND. L.J. 233, 251 (2008) ("Almost all presidents since
Roosevelt have used leaks as part of their efforts to promote their agendas and persuade the
public.").
42 See supra notes 35-40 and accompanying text.
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easily be categorized as hard or soft does not undermine the
importance of the underlying distinction for understanding the
causes and consequences of each type of disclosure.
Before turning to my case studies, it is important to distinguish
the subject of this Article from some neighboring areas. First, the
Article is not about White House or agency efforts to "test[ ] the
political waters for a policy" 43 by planting news of the policy prior
Nor does it address accidental leaks.
to its official release.
Finally, and most significantly, the Article reserves important
questions about the legality and ethics of soft whistleblowing. Any
discussion of leaks by government employees provokes widely
Some consider the behavior inherently
divergent reactions.
disloyal or unethical; 44 others argue that stringent protection of
45
government whistleblowers is critical to a functioning democracy;
and still others view government whistleblowing as a necessary
evil, with benefits for democratic accountability that must be
46
weighed against costs to workplace morale and national security.
Reflecting these divisions, "U.S. senators, depending on their
perspective of citizenship and organizational citizenship, have
described government informants as either 'patriotic' and 'citizen
crime-fighters' or 'snitches' and 'rats' "-comments that expose
deep national "ambivalence... about the role of individuals in
47
resisting illegality in their group settings."
Soft whistleblowing seems likely to provoke a similar range of
reactions, depending on one's views about the relative importance
of public accountability, on the one hand, and loyalty,
confidentiality, and administrative efficiency on the other.
43 Levi, supra note 7, at 629.
44 For example, "President Ronald Reagan said during his first term that he had 'thought

of the guillotine' for government employees who leaked classified information to the press."
David Wise, Leaks Make the PoliticalWorld Go Round, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 15, 1998, available
at 1998 WLNR 6432775.
45 See, e.g., Morse, supra note 27, at 422-23 (asserting that "an informed public is
essential to a functioning democracy" and "leaks are an essential part of informing the
public").
46 See, e.g., James S. Bowman, Whistle.Blowing in the Public Service: an Overview of the
Issues, 1 REV. PUB. PERS. ADMIN. 15, 16, 19 (1980) ("[W]histle-blowers have kept alive the
Effective methods
bond of trust between the American government and its citizens ....
need to be discovered to balance an individual's duty to his or her employer with his or her
duty to the public.").
47 Orly Lobel, Citizenship, Organizational Citizenship, and the Laws of Overlapping
Obligations, 97 CAL. L. REV. 433, 434 (2009).
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Whatever one thinks of the ethical choices of individual soft
whistleblowers, though, their actions are too easy and too free of
personal consequences to be easily quashed. 48
This Article
therefore reserves questions about soft whistleblowing ethics, the
potential civil or criminal liability of individual
soft
whistleblowers, and constitutional protections for the journalists
who receive soft whistleblowers' disclosures, and focuses instead
on the central governance questions: how to expand our
understanding of agency structure and function, and of
congressional, presidential, judicial, and public oversight of
agencies, to take better account of the undeniable fact that
people-including agency personnel-are prone to talk.

III. DOCUMENTING SOFT WHISTLEBLOWING
Soft whistleblowing is, for obvious reasons, very difficult to
document. We may never have hard data about how widespread
the phenomenon is, who does it, or what subjects it concerns. The
best evidence of the phenomenon necessarily derives from the
study of well-documented examples, as well as the knowledge of
soft whistleblowing sources and recipients.
This Part uses both methods. First, it provides three case
studies of soft whistleblowing, chosen to illustrate different forms
that the disclosures can take. Second, it reports the results of the
author's interviews with agency personnel, journalists, and Hill
Staff, who agreed to share their practical knowledge of the role of
soft whistleblowing in their respective professional spheres.
Together, the case studies and interview results provide a basic
picture of how soft whistleblowing operates, the methods and
motives of those who engage in it, and its effects on agency
policymaking.

48 See generally Levi, supra note 7 (describing the ease of divulging information to the
press anonymously).
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A. TITLE VII, THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
49
AND THE FORMATION OF THE NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR WOMEN

In 1965, Sonia Pressman Fuentes was a lawyer at the thenfledgling Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). 50
The EEOC enforces Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,51
which prohibits employer discrimination on account of race or sex,
among other categories. 52 As of 1965, however, the Commission
showed "very little interest in pursuing" claims of sex
discrimination, choosing instead to focus its attention on problems
of race. 53 For example, the Commission opted not to seek
invalidation of state protective laws, common at the time, that
"limited women to working a certain number of hours [per] day,
limited the amount of weight they could lift [on the job], and
otherwise restricted [their] working conditions.."54 Moreover, in
August 1965, the Commissioners voted 3-2 to continue to allow
newspapers to run "sex-segregated [job] advertisement[s], 55 under
headings like "'Help Wanted, Female,' or 'Help Wanted, Male,' "56
even though Title VII specifically prohibits "discriminatory
advertising." 57 As Fuentes later described the situation, "most of

49 For NOW's take on its own formation, which also credits Sonia Pressman Fuentes, see
The Founding of NOW, NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR WOMEN, http://www.now.org/history/
thejfounding.html (last updated July 2011).
50 History of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC): Interview by
Sylvia Danovitch with Sonia Pressman Fuentes (Dec. 27, 1990) [hereinafter Fuentes
Interview], http://www.utoronto.ca/wjudaism/contemporary/articles/history-eeoc.htm.
51 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2012).
52 Id. § 2000e-2(a)(1).

53 LEE ANN BANASZAK, THE WOMEN'S MOVEMENT INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE STATE 94-95
(2010).
54 Fuentes Interview, supra note 50.

For an example of state protective legislation, see
Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 416 (1908), which upheld an Oregon statute that provided,
in part, "no female (shall) be employed in any mechanical establishment, or factory, or
laundry in this state more than ten hours during any one day." See also Protective
Legislation, LAW LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/awhhtml/awlaw3/
protective.html (providing an overview of state employment laws that "protected" women
prior to the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
55 BANASZAK, supra note 53, at 95.
56 Fuentes Interview, supra note 50.
57 BETTY FRIEDAN, IT CHANGED MY LIFE: WRITINGS ON THE WOMEN'S MOVEMENT 99

(1998). Friedan presumably refers to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(b), which in relevant part
prohibits any employer from "print[ing] or publish[ing] or caus[ing] to be printed or
published any notice or advertisement relating to employment... indicating any
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the people at the Commission ...had come there to fight racial
discrimination; they did not want the Commission's time and
58
money sidetracked into sex discrimination."
Fuentes joined the EEOC General Counsel's office in October
1965, four months after the agency opened for business.5 9 She did
not consider herself an ardent feminist, 60 but she "read [the
language of Title VII] and thought it prohibited sex discrimination
She therefore became frustrated by the
in employment." 61
Commission's evident reluctance to pursue the many sex
discrimination claims that women regularly filed with the
agency. 62 She later described her feelings as follows:
I used to leave the office... and the tears would be
rolling down my face because I felt like I was in such a
difficult position. Basically, I was battling the whole
[C]ommission, except for the few people who felt as I
did. I didn't know how I got into that spot.... I used
to feel terrible about it, but that's the position in which
63
I found myself.
As an outlet, Fuentes engaged in soft whistleblowing. She and
other like-minded "midlevel staffers" at government agencies
"feminist
formed a network to support each other 64-a
underground in Washington spreading from government agencies
to Capitol Hill." 65 Other members included Catherine East,
Executive Secretary to the Citizens' Advisory Council on the
Status of Women (CACSW), 66 whom NOW founder and first
preference, limitation, specification, or discrimination, based on.. . sex." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e3(b) (2012).
58 SONIA PRESSMAN FUENTES, EAT FIRST-YOu DON'T KNOW WHAT THEY'LL GIVE YOU:
THE ADVENTURES OF AN IMMIGRANT FAMILY AND THEIR FEMINIST DAUGHTER 131 (1999).

59 Fuentes Interview, supranote 50.
60 FUENTES, supra note 58, at 134 ("I didn't know how I had gotten into this position....
No one had elected me to represent women."); FRIEDAN, supra note 57, at 100 ("Sonia
Pressman shut her office door and said, 'rm not a feminist.' ").
61 FUENTES, supra note 58, at 132.
62 Id. at 133-34; see also id. at 131 (noting that 37% of the complaints filed in the
Commission's first fiscal year alleged sex discrimination).
63 Fuentes Interview, supra note 50.
6

FUENTES, supranote 58, at 134.

65 FRIEDAN, supra note 57, at 95.
6

Catherine East, Papers, 1941-1995: A Finding Aid, available at http://oasis.lib.
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president Betty Friedan 67 later described as a "prime mover" in the
birth of the organization, 68 and Mary Eastwood, a young lawyer in
the Justice Department 69 and the co-author of a 1965 article titled
Jane Crown and the Law, which "drew on analogies between race
and sex in arguing for the application of civil rights law to
70
discrimination against women."
Fuentes gave her underground contacts inside information
about "women's rights cases that were developing"-or failing to
develop-at the EEOC. 71 Other members of the network then
passed the information on to feminist attorneys willing to
"represent the complaining parties in ...sex discrimination
72
lawsuits."
Fuentes felt the need to do more, though, to shift the EEOC's
posture on sex discrimination. In late 1965 or early 1966, an
opportunity presented itself: Friedan came to the Commission to
conduct research on Title VII. 73 Fuentes had declined to talk to
75
Friedan on an earlier occasion, 74 fearing career consequences.
On Friedan's second visit, though, the dam broke. "[fEeeling
particularly frustrated," Fuentes closed the door to her office and
emphasized to Friedan the importance of forming an "organization
to fight for women like the NAACP fought for African
Americans." 76 Only such an organization, members of the feminist
underground believed, could organize women to "march on

harvard.eduloasis/deliver/-sch00251.
67 The Founding of NOW, NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR WOMEN, http://www.now.org
history/thejfounding.html (last updated July 2011).
68 Anthony Ramirez, Obituary, Catherine East, 80, Inspiration For National Women's
Group, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 1996, at B6, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1996/08/20/
nyregion/catherine-east-80-inspiration-for-national-women-s-group.html (internal quotation
marks omitted).
69 FRIEDAN, supra note 57, at 100.
70 Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism,
and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 947, 954 n.10 (2002) (citing Pauli Murray & Mary 0.
Eastwood, Jane Crow and the Law: Sex Discriminationand Title VII, 34 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 232 (1965)).
71 FUENTES, supra note 58, at 134.
72 Id.
73 Id.

74 FRIEDAN, supra note 57, at 100.
75 Fuentes Interview, supra note 54.
76

FUENTES, supra note 58, at 135; FRIEDAN, supra note 57, at 100.
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Washington" and convince the EEOC and other government
77
agencies to take gender discrimination seriously.
Friedan described this conversation and its connection to later
events as follows:
[T]hen a young "Assistant to the General Counsel" of
the [EEOC] started to talk.... Sonia Pressman shut
her office door and said, ". . . I don't want to keep
realizing how this law could be used to get rid of
discrimination against women, and have to keep
shutting myself up, every day. I get so mad at the way
they're not doing it.... But I'm not free to do
anything about it. I'd lose my job.... At least a
woman like me has to stay here and watch. But you
Nobody can fire
can do what has to be done.
you.... You have to start a national organization to
fight for women, like the civil rights movement for the
blacks."
It was as if the whole female underground was
maneuvering me to the point where I would do what
they knew had to be done and weren't free to do
themselves. After my research days in Washington,
[East and Eastwood] would come up to my hotel
room... and [suggest names of female contacts]
needed to form a national organization of sufficient
78
clout to get [Title VII] enforced.
In June 1966, Friedan acted on these women's suggestions.7 9 At
a national meeting of state government commissions on the status
of women, she invited to her hotel room "anyone [she] met who
80
seemed likely to be interested in organizing women for action."
That first meeting ended without a decision, but by noon the
following day-June 29, 1966-an agreement had been reached:
77 FRIEDAN, supra note 57, at 96, 100 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
BANASZAK, supra note 53, at 95 (noting the need to create a "new organization to pursue
women's equality").
78 FRIEDAN, supra note 57, at 99-100.
79 See id. at 101, 104 (discussing Friedan's actions to create NOW).
80 Id. at 101.
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the women "took two tables at lunch to discuss forming the
organization."8 1 NOW was conceived.
The fledgling organization had no official ties to governmentindeed, the organizers' very idea was to create a non-governmental
group that could pressure government agencies to take on the
problem of gender discrimination.8 2 Yet the idea had come, at
least in part, from women in the agencies themselves, and "the
group photograph taken at the [NOW] organizing conference [in
the fall of the same year] shows the strong initial influence of
governmental employees": of the twenty-five women in the
photograph, Fuentes, Eastwood, and three others worked for
83
federal agencies, and another three worked for state government.
Friedan's government "gadflies" did not cease their activismnor their soft whistleblowing--once NOW came into being.
Rather, they continued to furnish the organization with inside
information vital to its mission. Fuentes recalls her continued soft
whistleblowing in vivid terms:
I took to meeting privately at night in [Eastwood's]
Southwest Washington apartment.. ., with her and
two other government lawyers. ...At those evening
meetings, I discussed the inaction of the Commission
that I had witnessed. . ., and then we drafted letters
from NOW to the Commission demanding that action
be taken in those areas. To my amazement, no one at
the Commission ever questioned how NOW had
84
become privy to the Commission's deliberations.
Friedan acknowledges the central importance of the
information these women provided to NOW. For example, she
describes the work of Catherine East as follows:
Catherine East of the Women's Bureau of the Labor
Department has been the pivot of the feminist

81 Id. at 103.
82 See BANASZAK, supra note 53, at 96, 98 (noting that NOW was an organization
intended to operate outside of government).
83

Id. at 96.

84

FUENTES, supra note 58, at 136.
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underground
in
Washington
spreading
from
government agencies to Capitol Hill. Midwife to the
birth of the women's movement, she has served its
development with research, intelligence, and alerts to
sabotage or strategic possibilities that the movement
itself would never have been able to afford. She never
violated any Government Secrets Act, but if it had
been known by her superiors.., how actively she was
supporting and servicing the organization of an
independent activist women's movement, she would
85
have been fired.
Fuentes and her contacts' underground feminist network, their
impassioned pleas to Friedan to start an organization like NOW,
and their subsequent work behind the scenes to promote NOW's
agenda all constitute soft whistleblowing.
The women's
disclosures were clearly both deliberate and unsanctioned, and the
information they relayed reflected no agency misdeeds. Rather, the
information concerned only agency recalcitrance on a controversial
issue of importance to the soft whistleblowers-the rights of
women.
This last point bears repeating, because it is the essence of soft
whistleblowing: a soft whistleblower uses her knowledge about
internal politics and policies at her employer agency to foment and
facilitate external pressure on that agency to change course. That
is also, of course, the essence of hard whistleblowing, but in that
context the understanding is that the agency (or some individual
at the agency) is engaged in misconduct, and the whistleblower is
enlisting the assistance of outsiders to hold the agency accountable
to objective legal or moral standards.8 6 In the context of soft
whistleblowing, the agency employee seeks not to right a legal or
moral wrong, but instead to influence the agency's policy choices.
Soft whistleblowing therefore lies at the heart of the central
questions of administrative law: how to ensure sound and rational
administrative decisionmaking and how to hold agencies
accountable not to objective moral or legal standards, but to the

85 FRIEDAN, supra note 57, at 95.
86 See supra notes 35-40 and accompanying text.
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public will and to the spirit (not just the letter) of the laws the
agencies are charged with implementing.
Fuentes' own account of her disclosures adds helpful contours to
the developing outline of soft whistleblowing. First, Fuentes did
not accidentally violate a trust; rather, she sought out feminists at
other agencies, and later at NOW, who could make good use of her
information.8 7 On the other hand, she notes repeatedly that she
felt her conduct in this regard was "unethical," that she "was
in... a difficult position," and that she "fe[lt] terrible" about being
at odds with her employer agency.88
Indeed, as a lawyer
representing the EEOC, Fuentes violated not just her own moral
code, but also the ethical norms then governing the attorney-client
relationship.8 9
In other words, Fuentes chose to be a soft
whistleblower, and she did so in spite of serious and well-founded
misgivings about the personal and professional ethics of that
choice.9 0
Additionally, although Fuentes may not have originally
considered herself an ardent feminist, she became quite passionate
about her cause to reform the EEOC's Title VII enforcement, and
her disclosures all related to that cause. That is, Fuentes does not
appear to have been a general EEOC dissident, but rather
someone who questioned a specific policy decision by her employer,
and who used soft whistleblowing as both an outlet for her
frustration and a tactic to shift that policy.
It is also worth noting the manner in which Fuentes passed on
her inside information: she met in secret with individuals she
knew, who shared her commitment to the cause of ending gender

87 See generally Fuentes Interview, supra note 50 (discussing Fuentes's deliberate acts to
violate her ethical duties to the EEOC).
88

Id.

89

See ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, Canon 37 (1937), http://www.americanbar.

org/content/damlabalmigratedcpr/mrpc/CanonsEthics.authcheckdam.pdf (discussing duty
of confidentiality owed to client).
90 Interestingly, these facts suggest that Fuentes felt that she was acting out of loyalty to
the EEOC's mission even as she took actions that she knew her individual superiors would
view as disloyal. This puts Fuentes in good company with many traditional whistleblowers
who, somewhat counterintuitively, "view themselves not as undermining their organization
but as 'defending the true mission of [the] organization by resisting illicit practices.'"

Amanda C. Leiter, Whistle ... and You've Got an Audience, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 747, 759
(2009) (alteration in original) (quoting MYRON PERETZ GLAZER & PENINA MIGDAL GLAZER,
THE WHISTLEBLOWERS: EXPOSING CORRUPTION IN GOVERNMENT AND INDUSTRY 6 (1989)).
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She could have passed on her information
discrimination.
anonymously, or called journalist contacts and asked to be quoted
"on background," 9 1 but she instead chose to cultivate a network of
people she trusted-including other soft whistleblowers-and then
Soft
to share her information openly within that network.
whistleblowers need not be lone wolves, but can work together in
92
networks to achieve the policy changes they seek.
Lastly, it is important to note that Fuentes and her fellow soft
whistleblowers were not whistling into the wind: they were an
integral part of a women's movement that was ultimately
successful in changing the federal government's attitude toward
sex-discrimination in employment and in bringing about an end to
gender-specific protective laws and want ads. 93 Catherine East
describes her role in the movement as that of "catalyst, in
furnishing information and knowing who knew what, and where
you went for [additional] information." 94 It is impossible to say, of
course, that any instance of soft whistleblowing led to any specific
substantive improvement in gender equality, but overall, Professor
Lee Ann Banaszak documents that government insiders'
participation in the feminist movement "directly influenced the
creation of movement organizations" like NOW, "affected the
political opportunities that were available to the movement," and
95
"furthered some policy outcomes."

91 See, e.g., Background Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.
com/dictionary/background (last visited Aug. 8, 2011) ("- on background: with the
understanding that information offered for publication will not be attributed to a specific
source <an official speaking on background>.").
92 For another example of a group of soft whistleblowers working together to shift the
policies of their employer agencies, see Rosemary O'Leary, The Bureaucratic Politics
Paradox:The Case of Wetlands Legislation in Nevada, 4 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 443
(1994). O'Leary discusses the "clandestine effort" of four U.S. Department of Interior and
Nevada Department of Wildlife employees to push new legislation, Public Law 101-618,
which "empowered them to make changes in their [wetlands] programs against the wishes
of their [agency] superiors." Id. at 443. She, too, reaches the conclusion that "bureaucrats
strive to affect their environment from both inside and outside the[ir] organization," using
their knowledge of internal politics and policies to increase external pressure on their
agencies to change direction. Id. at 445.
93 FUENTES, supranote 58, at 138-39.
9 BANASZAK, supra note 53, at 99 (internal quotation marks omitted).
95 Id. at 2. (Note that Banaszak argues the overlap between the government and the
women's movement "constrained" other policy outcomes.)
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B. THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION'S
WORKPLACE STANDARDS FOR ETHYLENE OXIDE

OHSA sets workplace standards for exposure to hazardous
chemicals, including ethylene oxide, a mutagenic chemical widely
used as a sterilizing agent by hospitals and manufacturers of
medical devices. 96 In 1971, acting on authority delegated by the
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 97 OSHA set 98a
relatively lenient ethylene oxide "permissible exposure limit."
The agency based that limit on then-current studies suggesting
that the effects of exposure were relatively mild. Over the next
decade, however, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and
the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health
conducted additional studies that indicated the chemical is a more
dangerous carcinogen than previously thought. 99 In response to
these studies, Public Citizen Health Research Group and a union
of hospital workers (collectively, Public Citizen) filed a rulemaking
petition in 1981, asking OSHA to implement a more protective
exposure standard.10 0
The Reagan Administration quickly denied Public Citizen's
petition. 10 1 The action then shifted to federal district court, where
the group had filed suit seeking to compel OSHA to lower the
permissible exposure limit. 10 2 In connection with that suit, Public
Citizen requested that the agency produce all of its ethylene oxiderelated documents. 10 3 OSHA largely complied, but declined to turn
over a few items that it claimed were covered under the Freedom
of Information Act's (FOIA) so-called "deliberative process"
privilege, which exempts from disclosure documents that reflect
internal agency deliberations.1 0 4 Among the withheld documents
was the memorandum mentioned above, 10 5 which OSHA senior
The
scientists had sent to administrator Thorne Auchter.
96 Vladeck, supra note 1, at 191.
97 Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (1970) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (2012)).
98 Vladeck, supra note 1, at 191.

99Id. at 192.
100 Id.

191 Id. at 199.

Id. at 198.
Id. at 199.
104 Id. FOIA's deliberative process privilege is codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (2012).
105See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
102

103
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withheld memorandum "piqued [Public Citizen's] interest."10 6 The
group speculated that the scientist authors, concerned about the
new evidence pointing to serious risks from workplace exposure to
ethylene oxide, might have "urged" Auchter to take "swift action"
10 7
to lower the permissible exposure limit.
As noted above, Public Citizen moved to compel OSHA to
produce the memorandum (a motion the judge ultimately
denied),10 8 but in the meantime a soft whistleblower came to
Public Citizen's aid. The unidentified soft whistleblower left the
memorandum in a brown envelope in the office of the group's lead
counsel, David C. Vladeck. 10 9
The contents of the leaked memorandum were much as Public
Citizen had imagined them to be," 0 and they ultimately proved
quite helpful to the group's case. For one thing, according to the
memorandum, OSHA had conducted a quantitative risk
assessment that revealed the effects of ethylene oxide to be even
worse than the EPA studies had suggested."'
Further, the
memorandum "emphasized" that OSHA health scientists and
technical staff had concluded (1) "'that the. .. accumulated
toxicity data on [ethylene oxide] exposure document[ed] a serious
health hazard for workers,"' and (2) that the then-current
exposure limit was "'inadequate to protect [hospital workers']
health.' "112 The memorandum recommended swift action to lower
the exposure standard-a recommendation that Auchter had
3
declined to follow."
Significantly, Public Citizen decided not to disclose its
possession of the senior scientists' memorandum, so as not to
spawn a "witch-hunt" for the agency source. 114 As a result, the
1O6Vladeck, supra note 1, at 199.
107

Id.

108 Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp. v. Auchter (Auchter 1), 554 F. Supp. 242, 249 n. 16

(D.D.C. 1983) (describing Public Citizen's unsuccessful motion to compel).
109 Vladeck, supra note 1, at 200. Vladeck indicates that he assumed the source was "a
senior official who disagreed with the OSHA's decision to deny [the rulemaking] petition."
Id. at 201.
110See id. at 200 (stating that the leaked memorandum confirmed that ethylene oxide
posed a danger to workers).
111 Id. at 200-01.
112 Id. at 201 (quoting the leaked memorandum).
113
114

Id.
Id.
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group's court submissions could not refer expressly to the
memorandum's contents. 115 Nevertheless, those contents informed
the group's subsequent (ultimately successful) litigation tactics. In
particular, Public Citizen urged the judge to review the document
116
"in camera" before deciding on the motion to compel disclosure.
The purpose of this move was not to improve the odds of winning
the motion to compel, which had become all but irrelevant after
Public Citizen received the brown envelope. Rather, the group
presumably hoped that the judge would be influenced by the
contents and tone of the memorandum as he considered the
substantive issues in the case. 11 7 The strategy proved effective:
the decision ordering OSHA to "promulgate ... an appropriate
emergency temporary standard addressing worker exposure to
ethylene oxide" specifically mentions the contents of the withheld
memorandum, which the judge found to be "at odds with OSHA's
118
denial of the plaintiffs' [rulemaking] petition."
Advance the clock a few years. OSHA appealed the district
court's order; Public Citizen won that appeal; and the D.C. Circuit
ordered the agency to conduct an expedited rulemaking to lower
the ethylene oxide exposure limit.1 1 9 In April 1983, OSHA began
120
that exercise, proposing a lower long-term exposure limit.
OSHA did not, however, propose to regulate short-term exposures,
even though the science supported such a limit. 21 The issue of a
short-term exposure limit, or STEL, quickly became the focus of
the comment period for the new rule. In a July 1983 public
hearing on that and other issues, Public Citizen played a key role
in "coordinating... experts and workers affected by [ethylene
122
oxide]" who testified in favor of a STEL.

115 Id. ('The question was how to use [the memorandum] without revealing that [they]
had a copy.").
116 Id.; see also Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp. v. Auchter (Auchter 1), 554 F. Supp.
242, 249 & n.16 (D.D.C. 1983) (noting that the court reviewed the memorandum in camera).
117 Vladeck, supra note 1, at 203 (noting that even though the motion to compel was
denied, the court now understood the significance of the memorandum).
11 Auchter 1, 554 F. Supp. at 249, 251.
119 See generally Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp. v. Auchter (Auchter 11), 702 F.2d 1150
(D.C. Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (detailing the procedural history of OSHA's appeal).
120 Vladeck, supra note 1, at 208.
121 Id. (noting that OSHA questioned the "necessity and feasibility of a STEL").
122

Id. at 208-09.
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On June 15, 1984, a soft whistleblower once again came to
Public Citizen's aid, calling Vladeck to suggest that he go to the
Federal Register office to view the new ethylene oxide rule, which
OSHA had just submitted for publication. In these days of e-filing,
the next scene would involve a Microsoft Word document that
contained a hidden record of all edits made to the final saved file.
When Vladeck reached the Federal Register office in 1984, though,
what he found was a hard copy of the final rule that "reflect[ed]
changes" to the rule "made at [the] behest" of the White House
Office of Management and Budget (OMB). 123 Better yet, the edited
hard copy "had a thin pencil mark drawn through the portions of
the document to be deleted, so the text earmarked for excision
could easily be read." 124 Plainly, the soft whistleblower had
intended to call Public Citizen's attention to that soon-to-beexcised text.
Investigating further, Public Citizen was able to piece together
a telling story. OSHA personnel had concluded that a STEL was
necessary to "reduce the cancer risk posed by [ethylene oxide] to
acceptable limits." 125 Accordingly, the agency planned to include
such a limit in its final rule. Prior to issuance of the new rule,
however, industry groups submitted comments to the agency and
the White House, arguing that the STEL would be unjustifiably
expensive. 126 The OMB then incorporated some of these negative
comments "word-for-word" in a letter to OSHA that "object[ed] to
the inclusion of a STEL on cost-effectiveness grounds."'127 Finally,
OSHA "did what it was told"-it "dropped the STEL and sanitized
(or tried to sanitize) all references to it in the final standard."'128 In
other words, OSHA "suddenly changed a considered position in
response to OMB pressure"129-a capitulation that might have
been lost to history were it not for a soft whistleblower's well-timed
phone call.

123

Id.

127

Id. at 211-12.
Id. at 212.
Id.
Id.

128

Id.

129

Harold H. Bruff, PresidentialManagement of Agency Rulemaking, 57 GEO. WASH. L.

124
125
126

REV. 533. 572 (1989).
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There is a longstanding debate about the reasonableness and
legitimacy of an expert agency's about-face in response to political
and White House pressure.1 30 Regardless of one's views on that
issue, the ethylene oxide story highlights the key role that soft
whistleblowing can play in judicial oversight of agency action.
Making quick use of information gleaned from the (line-edited)
draft of the final ethylene oxide rule, Public Citizen filed a second
lawsuit, this time challenging OSHA's decision to delete the STEL
from that rule. 13 1 The deletion, Public Citizen argued, "was
neither supported by the [scientific] evidence nor consistent with
the agency's mandate to set the most worker-protective standard
possible."132 The D.C. Circuit agreed, finding OSHA's rationale for
33
declining to include a STEL "insufficient to warrant affirmance."'
The ethylene oxide story reaffirms some of the aforementioned
attributes of soft whistleblowers and soft whistleblowing. First,
like Fuentes, the unidentified OSHA soft whistleblower (or
possibly whistleblowers) acted deliberately, in the face of
significant professional risks. Second, he or she appears to have
had a normative objective: to increase pressure on OSHA to
strengthen its workplace standards for ethylene oxide use.
soft
by
the
provided
information
with the
Finally,
Thus,
were
successful.
lawsuits
Citizen's
Public
whistleblower(s),
the OSHA case affords another example of a soft whistleblower's
130 Compare, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, Foreword; Overseer, or "The Decider"? The President in
Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696, 704-05 (2007) ("[n ordinary
administrative law contexts, where Congress has assigned a function to a named agency
subject to its oversight and the discipline of judicial review, the President's role-like that
of the Congress and the courts-is that of overseer and not decider. These oversight
responsibilities, in my judgment, satisfy the undoubted constitutional specification of a
unitary chief executive, while avoiding... executive tyranny."), with Kagan, supra note 34,
at 2331-46 (arguing for a strong, expansive, and highly participatory role for the President
and the Executive Office of the President (including OMB) in "address[ing] two core issues:
[making] administration accountable to the public and [making] administration efficient or
otherwise effective"); see also Glen Staszewski, Political Reasons, Deliberative Democracy,
and Administrative Law, 97 IOWA L. REV. 849, 854-61 (2012) (reviewing case law and
scholarly commentary on the validity of agency decisionmaking premised on political rather
than technocratic realities); Paul R. Verkuil, JawboningAdministrative Agencies: Ex Parte
Contacts by the White House, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 943, 952-58 (1980) (assessing the
constitutional and prudential limits on White House involvement in agency
decisionmaking).
131 Vladeck, supra note 1, at 213.
132 Id.
133 Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp. v. Tyson, 796 F.2d 1479, 1505 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
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ability to use his or her inside knowledge of agency operations and
deliberations to create (or at least contribute to) outside pressure
on an agency to rethink its policy choices on a controversial issue.
The OSHA soft whistleblower's modes of disclosure, though,
stand in stark contrast to those of Fuentes. Fuentes regularly met
in person with fellow feminists, and she passed her information
orally.1 34 The OSHA soft whistleblower instead chose to remain
anonymous. 135
In the instance of the senior scientists'
memorandum, that anonymity created a significant validation
problem for the recipient, Public Citizen, which had to find some
way to assess the authenticity and accuracy of the memorandum.136
The nature of that anonymous disclosure is also significant: the
OSHA soft whistleblower passed on a document, which creates a
paper trail in a way that oral information may not. Within an
agency, a document has a chain of custody-some set of people
who wrote or received it. If someone else obtains a copy, therefore,
the list of possible leakers is often well defined. Thus, the
recipient of a leaked document has to tread more carefully than
the recipient of oral leaks, because any use of the document could
implicate the soft whistleblower. Indeed, Public Citizen found
itself in exactly that position, ultimately choosing not to
acknowledge in court that it had obtained the scientists'
memorandum-which in any event it could not offer into evidence
because the group had no way to prove the document's
authenticity-lest the group's public possession of the document
137
land the OSHA soft whistleblower in hot water at the agency.
A third point about the OSHA soft whistleblower's disclosures
concerns the telephone call to Vladeck suggesting that he view the
hard copy of the final ethylene oxide rule in the Federal Register
office. The call is interesting because the soft whistleblower
effectively directed Public Citizen's attention to information (the
line edits to the final rule) that was readily available to anyone
who happened to go to that office on June 15, 1984.138 Yet the
phone call nevertheless conveyed the important non-public

134 FUENTES, supra note 58, at 134-35.
136

Vladeck, supranote 1, at 200.
See id. at 201.

137

Id.

135

138 Id. at 212.
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information that someone from Public Citizen should make the
trip to the Federal Register office on that day. In other words, the
caller helped direct Public Citizen to useful public information
that the group might otherwise have missed.
In the telephone call, the soft whistleblower served what might
be called a "signpost" function, pointing the way down a public side
road. The road is open and free for travel, but the signpost at the
corner nevertheless performs the invaluable service of calling the
traveler's attention to the road. Similarly, a soft whistleblower
may perform an important service by calling an outside party's
attention to nonobvious or hidden public information, such as a
visibly-edited hard copy of a final rule (as in the OSHA case), a
noteworthy document in a voluminous public record, or a critical
passage in a long rulemaking preamble.
In the latter instances, the soft whistleblower need not say very
much to convey an enormous amount of information. "Check out
Federal Register page 2,345, column 1," for example, could mean,
"There is something on page 2,345, column 1 that may be of
interest to you as you consider whether and how to support or
challenge the agency's new policy on issue X." Given the huge
volume of scientific and technical information that agencies must
process in formulating policy, the correspondingly large volume of
information public interest organizations and other outside groups
must sort as they formulate a response to the agency's policy
choices, and the limited resources of most such groups, it is
difficult to overstate the significance of a signpost soft
whistleblower who focuses the group's attention on the most
139
noteworthy information in the public record.
Moreover, the same signpost soft whistleblower may serve the
at least
duplicity--or
function of revealing
additional
equivocation-in an otherwise innocuous-seeming statement in an
agency document. Suppose, for example, that a signpost soft
whistleblower calls an outside advocate's attention to a passage in
a rulemaking preamble that states, "the agency believes the data
support" a particular policy choice. On its face, that statement is
unobjectionable and largely meaningless. If a soft whistleblower

139 See Leiter, supra note 90, at 752 (discussing the dilemma public rights litigators face in
sifting through "vast quantities of public information for material that is useful").
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calls an advocate's attention to the statement, however, the soft
whistleblower may be communicating that agency personnel are
not as unified in their beliefs as the preamble language would
suggest. In other words, the soft whistleblower's communication
serves as something of a poker "tell," signaling to the recipient of
the communication that the agency's seemingly bland language
masks a more intriguing and controversial reality-a reality that
bears further investigation and perhaps even warrants
litigation.140
C. THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT VOTING RIGHTS SECTION'S HANDLING
OF THE NEW BLACK PANTHER PARTY CASE

On election day 2008, Stephen Morse, a Republican
videographer, videotaped two African American men standing
outside a polling place in north Philadelphia. 141 The two men were
members of Philadelphia's New Black Panther Party (NBPP or
Party): the commander of the Party's Philadelphia Chapter,
Minister King Samir Shabazz, and Shabazz's chief of staff, Jerry
Jackson.142 They had stationed themselves outside the polling
facility and were wearing "paramilitary garb"; 143 Shabazz was
carrying a nightstick. 144 In the video, Morse and the men spar
verbally. Morse suggests that the men's attire and the nightstick
might be somewhat intimidating to the voters, and one of them
145
replies, "Who are you to decide?"
Someone uploaded Morse's video to various conservative blogs
and news sites, and, soon thereafter, the video came to the
attention of J. Christian Adams, then a lawyer in the Voting
Rights Section (Section) of the Justice Department's Civil Rights
140 Interview with Anonymous Source at Agency Watchdog Group, in Wash., D.C. (May
12, 2010) (transcript on file with the author).
141 Jerry Markon & Krissah Thompson, Dispute over New Black Panthers Case Causes
Deep Divisions, WASH. POST (Oct. 22, 2010), http://www.washintonpost.com/wp-dyn/
content/article/2010/AR20102203892.html.
142 U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS (USCCR), RACE NEUTRAL ENFORCEMENT OF THE LAW?
THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND THE NEW BLACK PANTHER PARTY LITIGATION: AN

INTERIM REPORT 5 (2010), available at http://www.usccr.gov/NBPHfUSCCRNBPP-report.
pdf [hereinafter USCCR INTERIM REPORT].

William Yeomans, Rebuilding Civil Rights Enforcement, 37 HUM. RTS. Fall 2010, at 2-3.
Markon & Thompson, supra note 141.
145 ElectionJournal, YOUTUBE (Nov. 4, 2008), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v-neGbKH
yGuHU.
143
144
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Division (Division). 146 Adams remembers thinking, "'There are
armed men in front of a polling place, and I need to find out if they
violated the [Voting Rights Act (VRA)], because in my mind there's
a good chance that they did.'"147 He and others in the Section
148
began the process of building a case under VRA section 11(b),
which provides in relevant part, "No person ... shall intimidate,
threaten, or coerce, or attempt to intimidate, threaten, or coerce
any person for voting or attempting to vote." 149 The Justice
Department attorneys interviewed several witnesses to evaluate
whether the Party members' presence at the polling site had in
fact intimidated potential voters. 150 On the basis of information
obtained in those interviews, a trial team recommended that the
Government bring a VRA suit against four defendants: Minister
15 1
Shabazz, Jackson, the Party, and the Party's Chairman.
In the waning days of the second George W. Bush
Administration, the Department of Justice followed that
recommendation, filing suit in the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania on January 8, 2009.152 Although
the Government served each of the defendants with its complaint,
none filed a response. 153 Accordingly, Section attorneys filed a
Request for Entry of Default against each defendant.' 54 In April
2009, the court granted the requests, entering an order of default
and granting the Government a few weeks to move for default
155
judgment.
At that point, however, the Government changed its course.
Participants offer conflicting explanations for the shift, but all
146
147
148
149

Markon & Thompson, supra note 141.
Id. (quoting Adams).

Id.

42 U.S.C. § 1973i(b) (2012).
150 USCCR INTERIM REPORT, supra note 142, at 7.
151 Id. at 14.
152 Complaint, United States v. New Black Panther Party for Self-Defense, No. 2:09-CV065-SD (E.D. Pa. Jan. 8, 2009), available at http://www.usccr.gov/NBPH/COMPLAINT-USA
vNBPP.pdf.
153

USCCR INTERIM REPORT, supra note 142.

Id. at 15; see also New Black Panther Investigation, UNITED STATES COMM'N ON CIVIL
RIGHTS, http://www.usccr.gov/NBPH/NBPH.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2014) (linking to all of
the filings in the case, including the four Requests for Entry of Default).
155 Order, United States v. New Black Panther Party for Self-Defense, No. 2:09-CV-065SD (E.D. Pa. Apr. 17, 2009), available at http://www.usccr.gov/NBPH/OrderforGovernment
tofileMotionforDefaultJudgment.pdf.
154
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seem to agree on the basic facts. On May 15, 2009, rather than
moving for default judgments against all four defendants, the
Department of Justice voluntarily dismissed the charges against
three of the defendants-Jackson, the Party, and the Party
Chairman-and sought only one, relatively narrow injunction
against the fourth defendant, Minister Shabazz. 156 Three days
later, the court granted that single injunction, enjoining Shabazz
from "displaying a weapon within 100 feet of any open polling
location on any election day in the City of Philadelphia."'157 The
case then came to a close.
The controversy, however, was only beginning. Conservative
newspapers and blogs decried the Justice Department's decision to
dismiss its case against three of the four defendants, attributing
the course-reversal to Obama Administration unease about filing a
VRA action against African Americans. 158 The Administration was
accused of "[r]everse discrimination"'159 and "taking us
Members of the U.S.
backward... [o]n ballot integrity."' 60
Commission on Civil Rights sent letters to Loretta King, Acting
Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Rights Division, asking
her to "advise the Commission of the Division's rationale for
dismissing the charges against defendants."'16 ' The Commission
156 Markon & Thompson, supra note 141; see also Rule 41(a)(1)(A) Notice of Dismissal,
United States v. New Black Panther Party for Self-Defense No. 2:09-cv-0065 (E.D. Pa.,
undated), available at http://www.usccr.gov/NBPH/Rule4l(a)(1)(A)NoticeofDismissalreNBP
PMalikZuluShabazzandJerryJackson.pdf.
157 Order, United States v. New Black Panther Party for Self-Defense, No. 2:09-CV-065SD (E.D. Pa. May 18, 2009), available at http://www.usccr.govlNBPH/OrdergrantingMotion
forDefaultJudgmentandenjoinderreKingSamirShabazz.pdf.
158Peter Kirsanow, DOJ's Dismissal of Voter Intimidation Charges, NAVL REV. ONLINE

(June 18, 2009), http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/183542/dojs-dismissal-voterintimidation-charges/peter-kirsanow; Editorial, ProtectingBlack Panthers,WASH. TIMES, May
29, 2009; Hans von Spakovsky, PantherPoliticizationat Obama DoJ,THE FOUNDRY (July 31,
2009, 9:55 AM), http:/Iblog.heritage.orgI2009/07/31/panther-politicization-at-obama-doj/; Jerry
Seper, Career Lawyers Overruled on Voting Case: Black Panthers Had Wielded Weapons,
Blocked Polls, WASH. TIMES, May 29, 2009, at Al.
159Editorial, Reverse discrimination in New Black Panther case, WASH. EXAMINER, July 7,
2010, http://washingtonexaminer.com/reverse-discrimination-new-black-panther.case/article/
12406.
160 Hans A. von Spakovsky, Holder Winks at Voter Intimidation, WALL ST. J., June 9,
2
2009, http://online.wsj.com/news/article/SB12445155 193396877.
161 Letter from Gerald A. Reynolds, Chairman, U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights, to Loretta
King, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., Dep't of Justice (June 16, 2009),
available at http://www.usccr.gov/correspdlVoterIntimidation2OO8LetterDoJ.pdf; see also
Letter from Abigail Thernstrom, Vice-Chairman, U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights, and Ashley L.
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then began a full-fledged investigation of the Department's
handling of the entire NBPP prosecution. 162
Meanwhile,
Republican Congressmen sought a "closed-door briefing" with
senior Division personnel to explore the rationale for the
163
dismissals.
Responding to these various accusations, the Division
repeatedly asserted its commitment to making "'enforcement
decisions based on the merits, not the race, gender or ethnicity of
any party involved.' "164 Supporters of the Administration, for
their part, labeled the conservative outcry over the handling of the
case, "Sound and Fury Signifying Nothing,"1 65 and "a phony
66
scandal."1
As is common with partisan disputes in Washington, the
controversy faded with time but never came to a particularly
satisfying conclusion.
In early 2010, the House Judiciary
Committee (then Democrat-controlled) rejected on a party-line
vote a House Resolution that would have "direct[ed] the Attorney
General to transmit to the House of Representatives all
information in his possession relating to the decision to dismiss"

Taylor, Jr., Comm'r, to Loretta King, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., Dep't
of Justice (June 22, 2009), available at http://www.usccr.gov/correspd/Thernstrom-Taylor
Letter2008.pdf (requesting additional information regarding the "Division's rationale for
dismissing [the] case").
162 See generally New Black Panther Investigation, UNITED STATES COMM'N ON CIVIL
RIGHTS, http://www.usccr.gov/NBPH/NBPH.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2014).
163 Jerry Seper, Senior Republican Wants Answers on Panther Case, WASH. TIMES, July
31, 2009, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/ul/31/senior-republican-wantsanswers-panther-party-case/; Jerry Seper, Lawmakers Seek Refiling in Panther Case,
WASH. TIMES, July 31, 2009, http://www.washintontimes.com/news/2009/ul/31/lawmakersseek-refiling-of-panther-case/; Jerry Seper, House Panel Rejects PantherResolution, WASH.
TIMES, Jan. 14, 2010, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/jan/14/house-panelrejects-panther-resolution/.
164 Jerry Markon & Krissah Thompson, Bias Led to 'Gutting' of New Black PanthersCase,
Justice Official Says, WASH. POST, Sept. 25, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
content/article/2010/09/24/AR2010092403873.html
(quoting Tracy Schmaler, a Justice
Department spokeswoman).
165 Michael Yaki, GOP and New Black Panthers: Sound and Fury Signifying Nothing,
HUFFPOST (July 20, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michael-yaki/gop-and-new-blackpanther b_652781.html.
166 Eric Schroeck, BipartisanAgreement: Fox-hyped New Black Panthers Case is a Phony
Scandal, MEDIAMATTERS (July 17, 2010, 5:28 PM), http://mediamatters.org/mobile/
researchI201007170012.
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charges against three of the four defendants in the NBPP case. 167
Later that year, the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights completed a
series of hearings and interviews and issued an "Interim Report"
The U.S.
titled "Race Neutral Enforcement of the Law?
Department of Justice and the New Black Panther Party
Litigation" (USCCR Interim Report). 168 Approved by five of the
seven Commissioners, the USCCR Interim Report reaches no final
conclusions but details at length the testimony of certain former
Justice Department officials, who leveled serious accusations of
race-bias and misconduct against the Obama Civil Rights Division
169
and individual Division attorneys.
Meanwhile, the Department of Justice's Office of Professional
Responsibility (OPR) conducted its own investigation of the NBPP
conclusions.
different
case, ultimately reaching starkly
Specifically, OPR's March 2011 report concludes that none of the
Department employees involved in the decision to dismiss charges
in the case "commit[ted] professional misconduct or exercise[d]
poor judgment."'170 On the other hand, the OPR Report also
vindicates Adams and the other attorneys who initiated the NBPP
litigation, concluding that they did so "based upon a good-faith
171
assessment of the facts and the law."'
Whistleblowers, both hard and soft, played a role in exposing
and then fanning the flames of the controversy. To see the
whistleblowers' role, one must pay close attention to the timing

167

Transcript, Markup of H. 994, H.R. 3190, and H.R. 569, Jan. 13, 2010, at 7, available

at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/transcripts/transcriptIO0113.pdf.
168 USCCR INTERIM REPORT, supra note 142, at 1.
169 Id. at 69-93. The Report states, for example, that those officials,
presented testimony that both raises concerns about the current
enforcement policies of the Department and provides a possible explanation
for the reversal in the course of the NBPP litigation. In sum, they
indicated that there is currently a conscious policy within the Department
that voting rights laws should not be enforced in a race-neutral fashion. In
their testimony, they gave numerous specific examples of open hostility and
opposition to pursuing cases in which whites were the perceived victims
and minorities the alleged wrongdoers.
Id. at 2-3.
170 OFFICE OF PROFL RESPONSIBILITY, No. 2:09CV00654, INVESTIGATION OF DISMISSAL OF
DEFENDANTS IN UNITED STATES V. NEW BLACK PANTHER PARTY FOR SELF-DEFENSE 2 (2011),

available at http://democrats.judiciary.house.gov/sites/democrats.judiciary.house.gov/ffles/
OPR%20Report.pdf.
171 Id.
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and circumstances of news coverage. As noted above, the Justice
Department filed its Notice of Dismissal of charges against
Jackson, the Party, and the Party Chairman on May 15, 2009.172
For the next two weeks, no local or national newspapers reported
on the dismissals. 173 On May 29, 2009, however, the Washington
Times wrote an incendiary piece alleging that "Justice Department
political appointees overruled career lawyers" and "ordered" the
dismissals. 174 As support for this provocative claim, the Times
cited "interviews," "documents," and information provided by
"[p]eople directly familiar with the case, who spoke only on the
1 75
condition of anonymity because of fear of retribution."
That same evening, conservative talk-show host Glenn Beck
picked up the story, noting mainstream media's refusal to cover
the Department's decision. 176 Interest swelled. Over the next
three days, twenty-four conservative news sites, blogs, and
television stations picked up the story, 177 expressing varying
degrees of "outrage[ ]" over the Department's decision, and either
linking to or citing the Washington Times' story. 178 In other words,
the Times article sowed the seeds of controversy, based largely on
information provided by unidentified "[p]eople directly familiar
with the case, who spoke only on the condition of anonymity
because of fear of retribution"179-that is, presumably, Justice
18 0
Department whistleblowers.
It is difficult to characterize the disclosures on which the
Washington Times based its story without knowing what was said
172 Markon & Thompson, supra note 141; Rule 41(a)(1)(A) Notice of Dismissal, United
States v. New Black Panther Party for Self Defense, No. 2:09-cv-0065 (E.D. Pa., undated),
available at http://www.usccr.gov/NBPH/Rule4l(a)(1)(A)NoticeofDismissalreNBPPMalik
ZuluShabazzandJerryJackson.pdf.
173 Lexis News Database Search, LexisNexis, http://advance.lexis.com ("News, All" for
"new black panther," date restriction 51112009-5128/2009) (search conducted Oct. 22, 2011).
174 Seper, supra note 158.
175

Id.

Transcript of The Glenn Beck Program, FOX NEwS NETWORK (May 29, 2009), available
at LexisNexis (TRANSCRIPT: 052901cb.258).
177 Lexis Nexis Database Search, LexisNexis, http://advance.lexis.com (search "News, All"
for "new black panther," date restriction 5/2812009-5/31/2009) (search conducted Oct. 22,
2011).
178 See, e.g., Roy Eappen, Dr. Roy's Thoughts, NEWSTEX WEBLOGS, May 30, 2009, available
at LexisNexis, Newstex ID: 35398567 Oinking to the Washington Times story).
179 Seper, supra note 158.
180 Interview with Anonymous Advocate 3, in Wash., D.C., July 26, 2010.
176
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or which documents were shared, but it is likely that both hard
If the sources made any
and soft whistleblowing occurred.
suggestion that specific Department officials deliberately
subverted enforcement of the VRA, or harassed or intimidated
underlings in an effort to achieve that subversion, disclosures
related to that conduct would certainly fit within the WPA's
definition of traditional (hard) whistleblowing, which includes
disclosure of violations of law or abuse of authority. 18 1 On the
other hand, disclosures about policy disagreements within the
Voting Rights Section over how strenuously to pursue particular
enforcement actions would fall squarely into the soft
whistleblowing category. 182 Such disagreements may be divisive,
but they do not indicate misconduct or malfeasance, so a source
who disclosed the disagreements to the press would likely fall
outside of both WPA protections and183 the broader "common
underst[anding]" of hard whistleblowing.
The trail of both hard and soft whistleblowing in connection
with the NBPP controversy continues after May 29, 2009, though
its next few turns are less well documented. On June 9 of the
same year, The Wall Street Journal op-ed page covered the story,
in a piece authored by Hans A. von Spakovsky. 184 A Senior Legal
Fellow at the Heritage Foundation and a former member of the
Virginia Advisory Board to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights,
von Spakovsky had spent several years in the George W. Bush
Justice Department, first as a trial attorney in the Voting Rights
Section, and then as Counsel to the Assistant Attorney General for
Civil Rights.1 8 5 He had left government, however, when he
published his Wall Street Journalop-ed.
Von Spakovsky's Wall Street Journal op-ed piece exacerbated
the NBPP controversy: he cited the Department's "inexplicable

181 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A) (2012).
182 See discussion infra Part IH.C (discussing disclosures related to disagreements within
the Voting Rights Section).
183 See supra note 36 and accompanying text (quoting the "commonly understood"
definition of whistleblowing, which extends to "'the disclosure by organization members
(former or current) of illegal, immoral, or illegitimate practices under the control of their
employers to persons or organizations that may be able to effect action' ").
184 Von Spakovsky, supra note 160, at A19.
185 Hans A. von Sparkovsky, THE HERITAGE FOUND., http://www.heritage.org/about/staffl
v/hans-von-spakovsky (last visited Feb. 3, 2014).
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dismissal" of charges in the case as "Exhibit A" for the proposition
that under Obama, the Civil Rights Division was "misinterpreting
key voting rights laws for nakedly political reasons.' ' 8 6 Von
Spakovsky does not identify his sources for this serious allegation.
In an affidavit later filed with the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights
as part of its NBPP investigation, however, he specifically
documents his professional relationship with two Voting Rights
Section attorneys who later left the Section and testified in the
Commission's investigation: J. Christian Adams, the Section
attorney who originally pursued the NBPP case, and Christopher
Coates, a former Section Chief. 8 7 In particular, von Spakovsky's
affidavit states that when all three men worked together at the
Justice Department, Adams and Coates expressed to von
Spakovsky their concern that some lawyers in the Voting Rights
Section opposed enforcing the VRA against "black defendants, no
88
matter how egregious their violations of the law."'
There is no direct evidence that von Spakovsky relied on soft
whistleblowing in writing his Wall Street Journal op-ed, but the
circumstances are suggestive: he had prior professional
relationships with both men; during the time when they were
colleagues at the Justice Department, they discussed their shared
concern that the Voting Rights Section engaged in raciallyselective enforcement of the VRA; at the start of the New Black
Panther Party controversy, von Spakovsky was the only one of the
three who could speak freely because he had left his government
position; and finally, to characterize the Department's decisions in
the case as "nakedly political," von Spakovsky likely had some
inside information about the role that political appointees in the
Department had allegedly played in getting some charges
dismissed.
Adams and Coates eventually left the Voting Rights Section
and went public with their (hard) whistleblowing. Their testimony
in the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights investigation accuses
various officials in the Obama Justice Department of relatively

186

Id.

187

Affidavit of Hans A. von Spakovsky

9, 14, July 15, 2010, available at http://www.

usccr.gov/NBPH/vonSpakovskyAffidavit_07-15-10.pdf.
16.
188 Id.
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serious misconduct in connection with the NBPP dismissals. 8 9
Even in the absence of Adams and Coates, though, others in the
Section continued to act as soft whistleblowers, passing on inside
information about the effects of the case on Section morale. In an
October 2010 article about the controversy, for example, the
Washington Post cites "[i]nterviews," "government documents,"
and four unnamed "Justice Department lawyers"-that is, four
other than Adams and Coates, who had left the Section at that
point and are named in the piece-for the proposition that "deep
divisions" in the Voting Rights Section "persist today over whether
the agency should focus on protecting historically oppressed
minorities or enforce laws without regard to race."'190
This story's lessons for the study of soft whistleblowing are
quite different from those of the prior examples because, as the
Washington Times and Washington Post articles demonstrate, the
hard and soft whistleblowers in the Voting Rights Section initially,
and perhaps primarily, conducted their whistleblowing through
the press. They either reached out to or were contacted by
reporters, providing sufficient information to allow the press to
paint a very unflattering picture of political polarization and
politically-charged decisionmaking in the Section.
First, a soft
That fact is important for a few reasons.
whistleblower who reaches out to a journalist likely has different
motivations than one who solely contacts groups like NOW or
Public Citizen. Speaking to a journalist is the first step in building
a public relations campaign, not a legal campaign. The goal,
therefore, must in part be to tarnish the agency's public image,
rather than simply to create congressional or judicial pressure on
the agency to change its approach to a particular issue. Of course,
someone seeking to change an agency's policies may develop a
broad campaign that includes a press angle, but a public relations
campaign is far less direct, and its outcomes less predictable, than
a targeted effort to garner congressional or judicial support for a
specific policy change. Among other things, the former can result

189 See USCCR INTERIM REPORT, supra note 142, at 69-90 (detailing the testimony of
Christopher Coates and J. Christian Adams).
190Markon & Thompson, supranote 141.
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in a backlash of support for the agency and its approach-as
happened, to a degree, in the NBPP context. 191
Presumably, therefore, a soft whistleblower who speaks to
journalists is different in kind from a soft whistleblower who
speaks solely to congressional staff or advocacy groups. The latter
wishes to incite legal action (oversight hearings, legal advocacy, or
even litigation) targeting a specific agency policy with which she
disagrees; the former, by contrast, may seek more generally to
damage the public image of the agency and the administration of
which it is a part.
That observation suggests another consideration relevant to
soft whistleblowers who choose to speak principally to persons,
like journalists and web-blog authors, whose role is to relay
information to a broader audience: the possibility that the soft
whistleblower is motivated not by substantive disagreement with
something specific the agency has done, but instead by some
deeper personally or politically motivated concern about the
character of the agency. A question of motives arises for any hard
or soft whistleblower, of course, and any recipient of inside
information from any source must verify that the information is
accurate and not merely the unsupported assertions of a
disgruntled insider. 192 That risk may be at its peak, however, in
the context of a soft whistleblower who chooses to speak primarily
to the press or to a blog author, precisely because such a source
need not build a case against a single agency decision or policy but
agency
unreasoned
about
claims
broader
make
can
or
e-press
press
decisionmaking. The burden then falls on the
recipient to ensure that all sides of the resulting news story or blog
193
post are well researched, and any accusations fully supported.
Another interesting aspect of soft whistleblowing to journalists
and blog authors is that the soft whistleblower loses all control of
She must, therefore, trust the
the information she relays.
a secret and to report the
identity
her
recipient to keep

191 See generally,e.g., Yaki, supra note 165; Schroeck, supra note 166.
192 See, e.g., ABEL, supra note 29, at 39 (discussing reporters' obligation to "identify [a]
leaker's bias" (internal citation omitted)).
193

Id.
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information accurately.1 94 The same is true of a whistleblower who
speaks to congressional staff or an advocacy group-there is
always the possibility that the initial recipient will pass the
information on to the press.
But congressional staffers and
advocacy groups can at least promise to keep the disclosure secret
as they decide how to use the information in their policy work,
whereas a journalist or blog author's central role is to publicize the
information she receives, and to do so ahead of her competition. 19 5
D. SOFT WHISTLEBLOWER INTERVIEWS

These histories establish that soft whistleblowing occurs and
illustrate some of its manifestations. To investigate the breadth
and contours of the phenomenon in one substantive context
(federal regulation of the environment), and to explore whether
soft whistleblowers also talk to congressional staff, I conducted a
series of interviews with environmental professionals on Capitol
Hill and in private lobbying firms and nonprofit advocacy groups.
I also spoke with journalists at a national newspaper and at one of
the Inside Washington publications. 196 Some of the interviewees
self-identified as politically conservative, others as politically
liberal. Some had worked in one of the federal environmental
agencies1 97 before taking their current positions; others merely had
contacts in the agencies. All of them had received disclosures from
soft whistleblowers and used those disclosures in their policy work.
These interviews are not scientific. Moreover, none of the
interviewees wished to be identified by name, and all of them
asked that I omit from this Article the particular details of their
conversations and relationships with soft whistleblowers.
Accordingly, the results of the interviews are reported in general
terms. Nevertheless, the results confirm that (1) the stories
194 See, e.g., id. ("When a reporter accepts a leak and publishes it he is engaging in a
transaction based on mutual trust. The reporter must believe that the information he has
received is trustworthy, and the leaker must believe that the reporter, in turn, can be
trusted to protect the anonymity of his source." (internal citation omitted)).
195 Id. (noting that newsmen strive to be "the first with the story" (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
196 See INSIDE WASHINGTON PUBLISHERS (Feb. 3, 2014), http://iwpnews.com/.
197 I define this term broadly to include the Department of Agriculture (Forest Service),
Department of Commerce (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration), Department
of Energy, Department of Interior, and Environmental Protection Agency.
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related above are not unique outliers but examples of a broader
phenomenon, and (2) congressional staff do indeed receive
considerable information from agency soft whistleblowers.
1. Soft Whistleblowing to Capitol Hill Staffers. I begin with
soft whistleblowing from agencies to Capitol Hill. Existing civil
service protections are based in part on the understanding that
hard whistleblowing by agency staff is both common and critical to
congressional oversight of agencies. In passing the Civil Service
Reform Act of 1978, for example, "Representative Pat Schroeder
linked whistleblower protection to the needs of legislative
oversight: 'If we in Congress are going to act as effective checks on
excesses in the executive branch, we have to hear about such
matters.' "198 One can readily imagine that a back-channel flow of
softer, policy-relevant information from agencies to Capitol Hill
could likewise help the members of House and Senate committees.
For one thing, an agency effort to draft a new rule can encourage
and speed (or discourage and slow) development of new legislation
on the same subject. Off-the-record information about the pace at
which the rulemaking is progressing can, therefore, be helpful to
supporters (or opponents) of a corresponding effort to push new
legislation.
Access to inside information can also be helpful to oversight
committees, which '"hold hearings on agency conduct (at which
senior agency officials may have to testify) and conduct
investigations into agency activities." 199 Suppose, for example, an
oversight committee was holding a hearing to investigate an
agency's decision not to pursue a particular enforcement action. A
soft whistleblower who provided the committee with undisclosed
agency documents relevant to his superior's testimony would
greatly enhance the committee's ability to ask probing questions
and expose holes in the testimony.
According to four congressional staffers, 200 the reality of soft
whistleblowing in this context accords with the above expectation.

198LOUIS FISHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33215, NATIONAL SECURITY WHISTLEBLOWERS

6 (2005).
199John F. Manning, Separationof Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, 124 HARv. L. REV.
1939, 2016 n.387 (2011).
200 All of the below information comes from a series of interviews I conducted with four
congressional staffers who wish to remain anonymous on June 29, July 8, and July 14,
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Unsanctioned leaks from agency staff to congressional staff are
constant and important to the work of legislative and oversight
committees.
In these sources' experience, information is usually passed
orally to a contact on the Hill with whom the soft whistleblower
has a prior relationship of trust. 20 1 Occasionally, though, a soft
whistleblower may also pass documents that the agency had
refused to disclose, such as internal emails that suggest agency
staff were more divided in their opinion of a new policy than the
agency's public statements about the policy would suggest. 202
Indeed, one source suggested that sometimes an agency soft
whistleblower will write an internal email or document with the
2 03
sole purpose of later leaking it to congressional staff.
As might be expected, the sources further indicated that the
frequency of these leaks varies with changes in administration and
other shifts in the politics of power in Washington. In particular,
"back channels" of unsanctioned communication between
confidential agency sources and congressional staff-that is, both
hard and soft whistleblowing channels-are most important when
there is a divided government. 20 4 This is perhaps unsurprising, at
least for soft whistleblowing, because the usual occasion for such
communications is a substantive disagreement over policy
development. Suppose, for example, a career employee is a lifelong
Republican who disapproves of the policies of the current
(Democratic) administration. She might choose to reach out to
likeminded (Republican) congressional staff to exert oversight
pressure on her agency, in an attempt either to shift the agency's
views on a particular issue or simply to "gum up the works" and
20 5
stall aggressive regulatory action.
The interviewees made the related point that, in their
experience, the flow of information is greatest from agencies that

2010. I will refer to them as "Anonymous Congressional Staffer 1, 2, 3, or 4." Transcripts of
these interviews are on file with the author.
201 Interview with Anonymous Congressional Staffer 1, in Wash., D.C. (June 29, 2010).
202 Interview with Anonymous Congressional Staffer 4, in Wash., D.C. (July 8, 2010).
203 Interview with Anonymous Congressional Staffer 1, supra note 201.
204 Interview with Anonymous Congressional Staffer 4, supra note 202.
205 Interview with Anonymous Congressional Staffer 1, supra note 201; Interview with
Anonymous Congressional Staffers 2, in Wash., D.C. (July 14, 2010); Interview with
Anonymous Congressional Staffer 3, in Wash., D.C. (July 14, 2010).
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have a substantive "mission," like the EPA or the Civil Rights
Division-agencies whose charters imply that they will serve as a
bulwark against a set of opposing interests or practices. 206
According to the interviewees, career staff at these agencies are
quicker than other civil service employees to reach out to outsiders
when they believe the current administration has impeded their
pursuit of their agency's mission. 20 7 Some agencies, though, have
less of a "mission-oriented" culture, and staff at those agencies are
correspondingly less likely to engage in either hard or soft
208
whistleblowing.
Both politics and agency culture are also relevant in
determining the direction of agency leaks, at least in these
interviewees' experience. 20 9 For some agencies, and in some
administrations, the information tends to flow in a single direction
(for example, from agency insiders to environmental advocacy
groups, or from agency insiders to industry).210 In contrast, other
agencies serve so many competing interest groups that the
channels of information flow are multidirectional and may operate
at cross-purposes. 211 Consider, for example, the constituency of
the Department of Energy, which includes the coal, oil and gas,
nuclear, and solar industries. These industries' interests-and
views on issues such as the wisdom of providing subsidies for
renewable energy or the benefits of carbon sequestration-may
diverge widely. A soft whistleblower inside the agency who leaks
to a congressional staffer who supports one of these industries
may, therefore, be providing policy-relevant information for
Industry A at the same time that his colleague down the hall is
providing the same information to a staffer who supports
competitor Industry B.
Finally, and unsurprisingly, information recipients on each side
of the political aisle hold mutually-exclusive suspicions that more
inside information flows to those on the other side. In other words,
206

Interview with Anonymous Congressional Staffer 4, supranote 202.

207

Id.

208 Interview with Anonymous Congressional Staffers 1, supra note 201; Interview with
Anonymous Congressional Staffer 2, supra note 205; Interview with Anonymous
Congressional Staffer 3, supranote 205.
209 Interview with Anonymous Congressional Staffer 4, supra note 202.
210 Interview with Anonymous Congressional Staffer 1, supra note 201.
211

Id.
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Democrats seem to believe that Republican staffers receive more
212
information from agency insiders, and vice versa.
The categories of information provided by soft whistleblowers
are many and varied. Most commonly, soft whistleblowers provide
general background information, such as the current status of a
rulemaking that the agency has not yet discussed openly. 2 13 As
noted, this straightforward information can be vitally important to
21 4
backers or opponents of pending legislation on a related subject.
Additionally, soft whistleblowers often serve the signpost
function, 215 pointing congressional staffers to publicly available
information hidden in a lengthy public record-the needle in the
rulemaking haystack. Imagine, for example, that draft language
in a new rule mirrors comments submitted by a private entity that
will benefit from the rule.2 16 Further imagine, though, that the
agency received thousands of pages of comments from interested
parties on all sides of the new rule. 21 7 Congressional opponents of
the new rule could use the similarities between the comment and
rule language as evidence of agency capture-but first,
212 For example, I spoke with several sources on the political right who speculated that
most of the leaking from environmental agencies is done by left-leaning policy staffers who
wish their agencies were more proactive in protecting the environment. In contrast, at least
one theorist cites journalists who claim that leaks are more common from right-leaning
officeholders who have a more "cavalier attitude... toward traditional government
procedures" and "right-wing ideological types, who are fundamentally contemptuous of
government." ABEL, supra note 29, at 28 (internal quotation marks omitted).
213 Interview with Anonymous Congressional Staffer 4, supra note 202.
214 Interview with Anonymous Congressional Staffers 2, supra note 205; Interview with

Anonymous Congressional Staffer 3, supra note 205.
215 See supra note 139 and accompanying text; Interview with Anonymous Congressional
Staffer 1, supra note 201; Interview with Anonymous Congressional Staffer 4, supra note
202.
216 See, e.g., Juliet Eilperin, EPA Wording Found To Mirror Industry's, Influence on
Mercury Proposal Probed, WASH. POST, Sept. 22, 2004, at A29 (noting that a Bush II
administration "proposal for regulating mercury pollution from power plants mirror[ed]
almost word for word portions of memos written by a law firm representing coal-fired power
plants," and indicating that Sen. James M. Jeffords (I-Vt.), then-ranking member of the
Senate Environment and Public Works Committee, had called for the EPA's Inspector
General to investigate "whether the industry had an undue influence on the agency's
proposed mercury rule").
217 In contested rulemaking proceedings, "[a]ffected entities with the financial resources to
do so submit lengthy briefs containing hundreds and even thousands of pages of
information, analysis, and argumentation that can quickly lead to what Professor Wendy
Wagner characterizes as 'information excess.'"
McGarity, supra note 23, at 1703-04
(quoting Wendy E. Wagner, Administrative Law, Filter Failure, and Information Capture,
59 DUKE L.J. 1321, 1355 (2010)).
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congressional staff must be aware of those similarities. A soft
Even more
whistleblower can provide the necessary link.2 18
helpfully, a soft whistleblower might suggest that a congressional
staffer should submit a FOIA request for particular documents:
"This is the FOIA request you should submit," or "Ask for these
219
documents."
Another common subject of soft whistleblowing is agency
wrangling with OMB or the White House. Soft whistleblowers in
this category commonly disclose either (1) tension between the
agency and OMB with respect to a developing rule or policy, or (2)
discrepancies between the agency's original policy objective and
the final policy that emerged from the agency after the required
OMB review. 220 Interestingly, one interviewee hypothesized that
soft whistleblowers may be more willing to disclose conflicts
between their agency and the OMB than internal agency conflicts,
despite the higher profile of the former, because the OMB is
perceived as an outside actor that occasionally-and illegitimately,
from the point of view of the soft whistleblower-blocks the
221
agency's policy choices.
It is also important to note that high-level political personnel at
an agency sometimes allow or even engineer leaks about OMBagency conflicts. Under my definition, these leaks still qualify as
unsanctioned soft whistleblowing, provided they are not approved
by senior White House officials. One interviewee asserted that
this circumstance occurred with some frequency in the George
H.W. Bush Administration, because then-EPA Administrator
William K. Reilly sometimes disagreed with final policies that the
218 See Tom Hamburger & Alan C. Miller, Mercury Emissions Rule Geared to Benefit
Industry, Staffers Say; Buffeted by Complaints, EPA Administrator Michael Leavitt Calls
For Additional Analysis, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2004, http://articles.latimes.com/2OO4/mar/
16/nationlna-mercuryl6 (citing several unidentified "EPA officials" and noting that the
Bush administration's "proposed mercury rule, published in the Federal Register in
December [2003], contain[ed] numerous paragraphs of verbatim language supplied by two
separate industry advocates").
219 Interview with Anonymous Congressional Staffer 1, supra note 201.
220 Id.
For further information about OMB review of major agency actions, see, e.g., Exec.

Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193, 13,194 (1981) (requiring White House review of
agency regulation), and see generally Steven Croley, White House Review of Agency
Rulemaking: An Empirical Investigation, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 821 (2003) (studying White
House review of agency rulemaking between 1981-2000, focusing especially on the Clinton
administration).
221 Interview with Anonymous Congressional Staffer 4, supra note 202.
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EPA adopted at the behest of the White House. 222 According to
this source, Reilly encouraged the disclosure of information about
the OMB's role to increase White House accountability for the final
223
and politically controversial policy choices.
Finally, several interviewees stated that soft whistleblowers
sometimes share background documents relevant to an agency
official's upcoming testimony at an issue briefing or oversight
hearing. 2 24 Indeed, one source who personally testified before a
congressional committee during the Reagan administration
indicated that it quickly became clear to him that the committee
members had viewed internal deliberative documents that his
agency had chosen not to share with Congress. 225 As noted above,
this advance notice about the contents of an agency witness's
testimony is useful to oversight committee staff, who can prepare
probing questions for the witness. 226 The ability to expose holes in
a witness's testimony is even more critical, however, for issue
briefings, at which agency staff brief legislative aides on issues,
agency policies, or draft rules. 227 These sessions are generally not
public, so there is no knowledgeable lay audience to help staff
recognize inaccurate or biased statements by the agency witness.
Information from soft whistleblowers can, therefore, prove
228
invaluable.
2. Soft Whistleblowing to Advocacy Groups and Lobbying
Firms. As in the congressional context, sources at public advocacy

222

Interview with Anonymous Congressional Staffer 1, supra note 201.

223

Id.

Id.; Interview with Anonymous Congressional Staffers 2, supra note 205; Interview
with Anonymous Congressional Staffer 3, supra note 205.
225 Interview with Marshall J. Breger, Professor, Catholic University Columbus School of
Law (June 22, 2011) (discussing Professor Breger's time as Solicitor of Labor during the
George H.W. Bush Administration, when he appeared before Capitol Hill oversight
committees only to realize that the committees had previewed his testimony and the
supposedly privileged documents on which it relied).
226 See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
227 See, e.g., Katie Greenshaw, Congressional Briefing Debunks Anti-Regulatory Myths
224

Behind 'Reform"Bills, CENTER FOR EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT (Oct. 30, 2013, 4:31 PM), http://
foreffectivegov.org/congressionaI -briefing-debunks-anti-regulatory- myths-behindreformbills
(stating that an expert panel "convene[s] to brief congressional staffers, members of the press,
and the general public about the complex processes that agencies must navigate before they
can issue important health, safety, and environmental protections').
228 Interview with Anonymous Congressional Staffers 2, supra note 205; Interview with
Anonymous Congressional Staffer 3,supra note 205.
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groups and lobbying firms confirm that soft whistleblowing is
rampant and vital to their work. 229 Again, the information tends
to flow along pre-established lines of communication, between an
agency insider and outsiders she trusts.
Most of the
communications are telephone calls, but there are also emails (to
and from personal accounts, of course), and even unlabeled
envelopes, as in the OSHA story.230
As with leaks to Congress, the pace of leaks to lobbyists varies
with changes in administration, with the most information leaking
from agencies that are "mission-driven."231 One source suggested
that the pace of leaks may also depend on the interpersonal
popularity of agency political staff.232 According to this source, the
more popular the political appointees in an agency, the less the
career staff resort to soft whistleblowing, independent of party
233
politics.
In general, these sources suggested that soft whistleblowers
work to advance all stages of the recipient groups' issue
advocacy. 23 4 For example, the soft whistleblower might disclose a
draft of a possible new agency policy, before the policy has been
finalized and approved. The recipient group can then express its
concerns about the potential policy by, for example, drafting a
public letter, blog post, or op-ed-"If [agency X] were to adopt
[policy Y], that new regulatory approach would have the following
negative consequences for [the public, our membership, or our
group]." This "advance guard" action enables the group to prime
the press and the public to react negatively to the policy if and

when the agency adopts

it.235

Soft whistleblowers can also be helpful on the substance of an
advocacy group's response to a new policy. For example, suppose a
whistleblower believes that her agency's data suggest the benefits
229 All of the below information comes from a series of interviews I conducted with three
legal advocates at D.C. law firms or advocacy groups on July 13, 14, and 26, 2010. Each of
the sources wishes to remain anonymous. I will refer to them as "Anonymous Advocate 1, 2,
or 3." Transcripts of these interviews are on file with the author.
230 Interview with Anonymous Advocate 1, in Wash., D.C. (July 14, 2010).
231

Id.

232

Interview with Anonymous Advocate 2, in Wash., D.C. (July 13, 2010).

233

Id.

Id.; Interview with Anonymous Advocate 1, supra note 230; Interview with Anonymous
Advocate 3, in Wash., D.C. (July 26, 2010).
235 Interview with Anonymous Advocate 2, supra note 232.
234
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of a proposed rule will be lesser than the agency claims, or the
harmful side effects will be greater. Alternatively, suppose that
some of the data supporting the new rule came not from agency
scientists but from a group with a potential bias, such as a public
health group or a regulated industry. If a soft whistleblower
provides the advocacy group with the data and its source, the
group can then use that information to file negative comments
236
during the rulemaking or to challenge the final rule in court.
One source indicated that agency soft whistleblowers may even
request that an outside group file a lawsuit against the requester's
employer agency. 237 In one instance, a relatively senior (and
politically appointed) soft whistleblower found himself frustrated
by a policy that the White House had directed his agency to adopt.
He therefore stepped out of the public meeting at which the policy
was announced, signaled to an outside advocate to join him in the
hallway, asked the advocate to sue the agency, and promised to
help the advocate identify potential avenues of legal attack to
238
challenge the new policy as arbitrary and capricious.
3. Soft Whistleblowing to the Press. Lastly, and least
surprisingly, soft whistleblowers also talk regularly to the press.
Other authors have explored the press's reliance on confidential
government sources, 23 9 even proposing a "typology of leaks" based
on the motivation of the news source, from someone who "leaks in
order to 'satisfy a sense of self-importance'" (the "ego leak") to
someone who "leak[s] with the long-range pragmatic motive of
developing good relationships with the press as 'a play for future
favor'" (the "goodwill leak"). 240
In this typology, soft
whistleblowing would be characterized as a "policy leak"-the
Id.
Interview with Anonymous Advocate 1, supra note 230.
236 Interview with Anonymous Advocate 2, supra note 232.
239 See, e.g., Sandra Davidson & David Herrera, Needed: More than a Paper Shield, 20
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1277, 1284-85 (2012) (explaining the need for a law shielding
journalists from prosecution when they refuse to disclose their confidential sources, and
proposing language for a model shield law); see also RonNell Andersen Jones, Media
236

237

Subpoenas: Impact, Perception, and Legal Protection in the Changing World of American
Journalism, 84 WASH. L. REV. 317, 367-68 (2009) (reporting the results of an empirical
study of media subpoenas and discussing the impacts of those subpoenas on the availability
and use of confidential sources).
240 Levi,
supra note 7, at 624-27 & nn.53-63 (quoting STEPHEN HESS, THE
GOVERNMENT/PRESS CONNECTION 77 (1984)) (setting out a typology of leaks).
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provision of inside information "to gain attention for an issue or
policy option"; "to force action on an issue"; or "to consolidate
241
support from the public or a constituency outside government."
The two interviews conducted with journalists for this Part
reaffirmed many of the observations about soft whistleblowing
noted above. 242 Especially interesting was a new observation
about the mode of leaking to the press. Sources stated that soft
whistleblowers who wish to release information to journalists often
use an intermediary, such as a nonprofit group, as their "voice."
They disclose their information to a confidante in the advocacy
group and the group then passes the information along to
243
appropriate press contacts.
4. Soft Whistleblower Organizations. The practice of using an
outside contact as a conduit for leaked information is so well
recognized in Washington that several nonprofit organizations
exist for the primary purpose of supporting hard and soft agency
whistleblowers and relaying the whistleblowers' information to the
press or to other audiences. For example, in the environmental
context, the group Public Employees for Environmental
Responsibility, or PEER, self-identifies as "a service organization
[that allows] federal [and] state ...public employees.., to work
as 'anonymous activists' so that agencies must confront the
message, rather than the messenger." 244 PEER's short instruction
manual for whistleblowers, The Art of Anonymous Activism:
Serving the Public While Surviving Public Service, advises
prospective hard or soft whistleblowers to find an outside
advocate, such as a union, an advocacy group, or a professional
society, that is "willing and able to... act[] as both a shield to
protect the identity of [the employee whistleblower] and a conduit

241 Id. at 625 n.56 (adding a gloss to the simpler definition of "policy leak" provided by
STEPHEN HESS, THE GOVERNMENT/PRESS CONNECTION 77 (1984), "a straightforward pitch
for or against a proposal").
242 All the below information comes from a series of interviews I conducted with two
journalists at nationally circulated papers based in Washington, DC on June 29, 2010.
Each of the sources wishes to remain anonymous. I will refer to them as "Anonymous
Journalists 1 or 2." Transcripts of these interviews are on file with the author.
243 Interview with Anonymous Journalist 1, in Washington, DC (June 29, 2010); Interview
with Anonymous Journalist 2, in Washington, DC (July 3, 2010).
244 PEER, http://peer.org/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2014).
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to the outside world so that the employee['s] concerns can be
245
known."
PEER's website then advertises that the organization will
provide precisely this service for employees of federal and state
environmental agencies:
Public employees can use PEER to address issues
inside an agency, while remaining safely anonymous
and thereby avoiding agency retaliation. For example:
* PEER can file a Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA) request for the precise documents that the
employee directs, but on PEER letterhead and
signed by PEER staff; ...
" [PEER can handle p]rotests or appeals of permit or
other agency decisions.... Using PEER may help
ensure that critical information purged from
agency files is officially on the record....
PEER edits, prints, distributes and acts as "press
agent" for reports and white papers free of charge.
The author's identity remains unknown, ensuring that
the real messenger-the employee-stays out of
246
harm's way.
Organizations outside the environmental context also advertise
that they serve this function of soliciting, re-bundling and
releasing leaked information from both hard and soft
whistleblowers. For example, the two co-authors of PEER's Art of
Anonymous Activism, The Project on Government Oversight
(POGO) and the Government Accountability Project (GAP), both
indicate that they are willing to serve this function for government
247
sources in a variety of contexts.
245

PEER, THE ART OF ANONYMOUS ACTIVISM: SERVING THE PUBLIC WHILE SURVIVING

PUBLIC SERVICE 9-10, available at http://www.peer.org/assets/docsThe%2Art%20of%20A
nanymous%20Activism.pdf.
246 Membership Benefits, PEER, http://www.peer.org/take-action/membership-benefits.html
(emphasis added) (last visited Feb. 3, 2014).
247 Methodology, POGO, http://www.pogo.org/about/methodology.html (last visited Feb. 3,
2014) ('POGO is an investigative organization with an expertise for working with sources
inside the government and whistleblowers to document evidence of corruption, waste, fraud,
or abuse.... POGO's investigators and journalists take leads and information from insiders
and verify the information through investigations using the Freedom Of Information Act,
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E. MODES AND CONSEQUENCES OF SOFT WHISTLEBLOWING

These case studies and interviews provide important new
information on the widespread phenomenon of soft whistleblowing.
The story of Fuentes's involvement with NOW suggests that soft
whistleblowing is quite deliberate and cause-oriented, undertaken
in spite of ethical rules and professional risks, and flows to
outsiders whom the soft whistleblower has reason to trust.
Further, soft whistleblowers may be networked (like the feminist
underground), and in that configuration, they can be quite
powerful in harnessing their inside information to create outside
advocacy groups and then to assist those groups in effecting
248
dramatic changes in agency policy.
In accordance with several of these observations, the OSHA soft
whistleblower(s) acted deliberately to promote their apparent
cause (strengthening OSHA's regulation of ethylene oxide); they
were undeterred by the risk of discovery; and they materially
assisted Public Citizen's successful litigation efforts. The ethylene
oxide story also highlights several further observations about soft
whistleblowing. First, soft whistleblowers who pass on physical
documents run a significant risk of discovery, and-as a corollary
to this-the recipients of such documents must be judicious in
their use. 249 Second, the recipients of unsanctioned disclosures
always face a validation problem, and that problem is especially
severe if the soft whistleblower's identity is unknown. 250 Third,
soft whistleblowers do not always pass on non-public information;
they sometimes serve the important signpost function of calling an
outside entity's attention to noteworthy public information that
the outsider would otherwise have overlooked. 251 Finally, soft
interviews, and other fact-finding strategies. We then report on our findings to the media,
Congress, and public interest groups through alerts, statements, and studies. At the same
time, we protect the identity of our insider partners the way that reporters in the mainstream
media do, ensuring that they are not punished for their patriotism.'); Public Health, GAP,
http://www.whistleblower.org/program-areas/public-health (last visited Feb. 3, 2014) ("GAP's
Public Health program... work[s] with whistleblowers to get their disclosures out to
Congress, regulatory bodies, and the media.").
248 See discussion supra Part III.A (discussing the formation and operation of NOW).
249 See, e.g., Vladeck, supra note 1, at 201 (noting the challenges Public Citizen faced in
using the leaked memorandum without revealing that they had a copy).
250 Id. (noting the difficulties of authenticating the memorandum).
251 See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
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whistleblowers may also serve as poker "tells," revealing when an
agency is "bluffing" and its strong policy bid masks weak scientific
252
or economic data.
The story of the NBPP soft whistleblowers suggests that soft
whistleblowers may sometimes be motivated less by a desire to
change an agency's approach to a particular issue than by the
desire to tarnish the agency's public image or create broad public
support for a change in agency management or even a change in
presidential administration. Further, the NBPP story highlights
the fact that a soft whistleblower loses control of the information
she relays as soon as that information becomes public. A soft
whistleblower who seeks to use information to tarnish an agency's
public image, for example, may find that same information used to
burnish the agency's image with a different audience. 253
The interview results add still more detail to this picture. They
suggest that soft whistleblowing is ubiquitous and important. It is
principally founded on strong interpersonal relationships between
the source and the recipient. It sometimes reflects internal
divisions at the source agency, and originates from staff who feel
that their important work has been jeopardized by their superiors.
More strikingly, it sometimes reflects divisions between the agency
and the White House and originates from agency staff who feel
their work has been jeopardized not by their agency superiors, but
by the President or his advisors.
IV. AGENCY POLICY DEVELOPMENT AND OVERSIGHT
Clearly, agencies leak. More interesting and surprising is the
fact that a large amount of the non-public information that finds
its way into the hands of congressional staff, watchdog groups, and
the press concerns issues of policy rather than evidence of
malfeasance, however broadly defined. The above narratives and
interviews provide the materials for initial conclusions about the
consequences of soft whistleblowing for agency function and
accountability. These results are preliminary. There is much we
do not yet know about soft whistleblowing. The case studies and

252
253

See supranote 140 and accompanying text.
Markon & Thompson, supranote 141.
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interviews also raise important questions that call for further
research.
A. IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY DEVELOPMENT

With respect to policy development, soft whistleblowing has two
broad types of effects. First, soft whistleblowers may serve a
steadying, keel-like function, keeping their employer agencies on a
relatively constant policy course as administrations change and
political winds shift. Second, soft whistleblowing may subtly shift
the balance of power within agencies, from those individuals who,
for professional or personal reasons, are less willing to share nonpublic information to those who are more willing.
1. Course Corrections. Imagine a career employee of a missiondriven agency like the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration. That employee likely has a personal view of the
mission on which she and her agency are engaged. She may,
therefore, be more likely to leak information to sympathetic
outsiders when she perceives that her superiors at the agency or in
the White House are opposed to her view. Suppose, for example,
the employee has been working to develop a new safety regulation
for a period of months or years, and then, after a change in
administration, she senses a weakening in her superiors' support
for her undertaking. She might well choose to reach out to friends
on Capitol Hill, at a watchdog group, or in the press, either to
encourage those entities to pressure the agency to continue its
work on the new policy or to lay the groundwork for a future
lawsuit if the agency ultimately releases a watered-down version
of the policy she helped to develop. I describe this kind of leak as
serving a rudder- or keel-like function because, from the
employee's perspective, she is keeping the agency on-mission in
the face of shifting political pressures.
The whistleblower(s) in the OSHA/ethylene oxide story fit this
paradigm. As described above, 25 4 in the 1970s, employees at the
EPA and the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health
(NIOSH) conducted studies on the carcinogenicity of ethylene
oxide, ultimately concluding that hospital employees needed better
254 See discussion supra Part IIl.A (discussing whistleblowing related to OSHA's
workplace standards for ethylene oxide).
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protection than OSHA's 1971 workplace standard provided. But
then the Reagan administration took office, and OSHA denied
Public Citizen's petition to strengthen regulation of the chemical.
At that point, one or more of the public employees involved in the
EPA or NIOSH research, and/or one or more of those employees'
contacts at OSHA, may have felt that their superiors were
undermining their diligent work to pave the way for a stricter
standard. The frustrated employee(s), therefore, reached out to
Public Citizen and assisted the group's efforts to push the agency
back onto what the soft whistleblower(s) likely believed was the
agency's rightful regulatory course.
From the outside, if one were to chart OSHA's policy course
over the 1970s and early 1980s, one would see the soft
whistleblowers' interventions in the ethylene oxide rulemaking as
course-corrective. OSHA pursued an affirmatively pro-regulatory
approach in the 1970s, but "[b]y the late 1970s, rising inflation and
the nation's economic situation ...further[ed] regulatory reform
efforts to reduce the costs of compliance with federal [workplace
safety] rules. Legislative attempts to limit OSHA also mounted
steadily and peaked in 1980,"255 the same year that Reagan was
elected on a decidedly deregulatory platform. 256 The OSHA soft
whistleblowers' interventions could thus be seen as an effort-and
a successful one, with the help of Public Citizen and the courts-to
keep OSHA on its historic, more affirmatively regulatory path,
despite the country's newly deregulatory mood.
The evidence that soft whistleblowers generally serve this
In the NOW
course-steadying function is decidedly mixed.
story,257 Fuentes and her fellow soft whistleblowers charted a new
course for the EEOC, rather than helping to keep the agency on its
preexisting path. These members of the feminist underground
grew tired of the agency's quiescence in the face of the sexist
workplace status quo, and they used their connections to spark the
creation of NOW and to provide the organization with the
information and ammunition it needed to give the EEOC a

255

OSHA, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, REFLECTIONS ON OSHA'S HISTORY 14 (2009), available at

http://www.osha.gov/history/OSHA_HISTORY_3360s.pdf.
258

See, e.g., MARTHA DERTHIOK & PAUL J. QUIRK, THE POLITICS OF DEREGULATION 30

(1985) (noting that Reagan ran on a platform of deregulation).
257 See discussion supra Part III.A.
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significant push in a new direction. 258 To continue (briefly!) the
sailing analogy, these soft whistleblowers shifted the wind-or
jerked the rudder-and steered the agency off its historic course.
To account for the role of the soft whistleblowers in this example,
therefore, one would have to consider the history of, and
The NOW soft
Congress's intent in passing, Title VII.
whistleblowers surely saw themselves as keeping the EEOC on the
correct course under Title VIi-that is, the course most consistent
with legislative text and intent-even though their actions were
quite clearly intended to push the agency off of its chosen course.
Without considerably more data, it is difficult to gauge which
example-the OSHA/ethylene oxide story or the NOW story-best
illustrates the function that soft whistleblowers generally serve
with respect to policy development. There are reasons to expect
that further research would indicate soft whistleblowers more
often serve a course-steadying function than a course-charting
function. Existing research on hard whistleblowers indicates that
they view themselves not as undermining their organization but as
"defending the true mission of [the] organization by resisting illicit
practices. '25 9 One might expect that most soft whistleblowers
similarly view themselves not as forces of change, but as loyal
employees of an agency with an important and longstanding policy
This suggests that, in most instances, these soft
mission.
whistleblowers use their inside information to elicit help from
outsiders when they perceive that some actor inside the agency or
the administration is threatening that mission. But there are
clearly those, like the NOW soft whistleblowers, who instead elicit
help from outsiders to vindicate congressional intent when they
believe their agency fundamentally misunderstands its mission.
This dichotomy raises a series of questions that deserve further
research. For example, one might ask:
*

258
259

Whether soft whistleblowing is more common from
agencies that view themselves as having a
particular point of view or mission;

Fuentes Interview, supranote 50.
GLAZER & GLAZER, supra note 90, at 6.
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Whether career employees engage in soft
whistleblowing more commonly than political
appointees;
Whether soft whistleblowers generally view
themselves as dissidents or as loyal to their
organization's broader mission;
Whether soft whistleblowing is most common after
the White House changes political hands; and
Whether the volume of soft whistleblowing is
greatest when an incoming administration
proposes to shift its policy course (for example, by
promising sweeping new regulations on a
particular subject, or by adopting a strongly
deregulatory stance).

Definitive answers to these questions may be impossible to obtain,
given the sensitivity of the subject matter and the selection biases
inherent in a voluntary survey. A positive answer to one or more
of these questions, however, would tend to substantiate the
hypothesis that soft whistleblowers principally serve as coursecorrective agency rudders or keels, rather than as course-charting
watchdogs of congressionalintent.
2. Internal Power Shifts. A second hypothesis concerns the
implications of soft whistleblowing for agency power dynamics. As
described above, soft whistleblowing enables an agency insider to
wield her expertise and her inside knowledge of agency politics
and policies to create or direct outside pressure on her agency to
shift its policy making direction. Soft whistleblowing thus gives
an insider some additional power-above and beyond her job
description-to affect agency policy development. 260 As such, the
agency employees who are willing to engage in soft whistleblowing

260 Cf. Ralph S. Brower & Mitchel Y. Abolafia, BureaucraticPolitics:The View from Below,
7 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 305, 311 (1997) ("As one informant put it, 'everybody has
their mandates and guidelines. If you follow them, most of the time they'll work. Many
times they will not. So you take it upon yourself to speed things up a bit.' Those who
initiate these actions describe them as entrepreneurial,problem solving, or shortcuts.");
Ingber, supra note 33, at 10 (discussing how "diverse kinds of catalysts, external and
internal," influence the identity of the relevant legal decisionmakers in the executive and

empower different players in the decisionmaking process).
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may accrete some policymaking power to themselves, and away
from those who are unwilling.
The question, then, is whether anything can be said about
which kinds of agency employees are more likely to engage in soft
whistleblowing, and which kinds are less likely. I suspect that,
personal predispositions aside, agency employees with legal
training are less likely than some other professional employees to
be willing to disclose nonpublic information about their employers'
activities. Two observations support this hypothesis. First, the
congressional staff, interest group employees, and journalists
interviewed indicated that they rarely receive disclosures from
agency lawyers. 26 1 Second, lawyers' professional code of ethics
prohibits disclosing client confidences, except in certain narrow
circumstances, 262 whereas some other professions' ethical codesnotably the code of ethics for engineers-affirmatively encourage
263
disclosure in some circumstances.
The concept of a lawyer-client privilege that protects the
confidentiality of client communications is quite familiar.
Analyzing the application of this privilege to government lawyers
is complicated, however, by the fact that the identity of the
lawyer's client is not immediately obvious-the client could be the
government as a whole, the executive branch, the specific agency
for which the lawyer works, or the public at large. There is some
debate in the academic literature on this point, 264 but whatever the
answer should be, "the ethical rules for the D.C. Bar, the
jurisdiction with the most government lawyers, explicitly state
that government lawyers should treat the agency for which they
2 65
work as their client."
Assuming the agency as client, the American Bar Association's
Model Rules of Professional Conduct send a clear message
regarding the ethics of a government lawyer's soft whistleblowing.
Except in a few circumstances, the lawyer is forbidden from
261

See discussion supraPart III.D.1-3.

262

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2012).

263

NSPE, CODE OF ETHICS FOR ENGINEERS Hl:1:A; III:2:B (2003).
See, e.g., Morse, supra note 27, at 434-35 (discussing the difficulty of defining a

264

government lawyer's client); Clark, supra note 40, at 1049-55 (discussing a government
lawyer's "wide variety of possible clients").
265 Morse, supra note 27, at 435 (quoting DIST. OF COLUMBIA RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
1.6(k) (2007)).
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"reveal[ing] information relating to the representation of [the
266
agency] unless [the agency] gives informed consent."
There are a few exceptions to this rule, but they are quite
narrow and specific, and none of them is generally relevant to soft
whistleblowing. A lawyer may disclose client confidences:
(1) to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial
bodily harm;
(2) to prevent the client from committing a crime or
fraud that is reasonably certain to result in substantial
injury to the financial interests or property of another
and in furtherance of which the client has used or is
using the lawyer's services;
(3) to prevent, mitigate or rectify substantial injury to
the financial interests or property of another that is
reasonably certain to result or has resulted from the
client's commission of a crime or fraud in furtherance
of which the client has used the lawyer's services;
(4) to secure legal advice about the lawyer's compliance
with these Rules;
(5) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the
lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the
client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge or
civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in
which the client was involved, or to respond to
allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's
representation of the client; [or]
267
(6) to comply with other law or a court order.
By definition, a soft whistleblower discloses information that does
not evince a "crime or fraud," so exceptions (2) and (3) do not
apply. Exceptions (4)-(6) allow disclosures when the agency
lawyer is concerned about her own legal status, or when the
lawyer is forced to disclose, so they too have little to say about a
situation in which a lawyer at an agency, who is otherwise in good
standing, wishes to violate her agency's wishes and disclose nonpublic information about the agency's conduct in order to generate
266

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2012).

267

Id. R. 1.6(b)(1)-(6).
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outside pressure on the agency to change its views about a
particular substantive issue.
The only one of these exceptions that could relate to some
instances of soft whistleblowing, therefore, is the first-a
government lawyer may disclose agency confidences when
necessary "to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial
bodily harm."268 In some instances, a soft whistleblower might
argue that this exception covers her choice to pass on inside
information about agency policy development. For example, the
OSHA soft whistleblower(s) could attempt to claim that this
exception applied to communications with Public Citizen, if the
whistleblower believed that strengthening the ethylene oxide rule
was necessary to prevent substantial bodily harm to exposed
In most instances of soft whistleblowing,
hospital workers.
including both the NOW and NBPP examples, however, the agency
employees' leaks concern more prosaic matters-agency policy
choices with which the soft whistleblower disagrees, but which
pose no threat to life or limb.
Moreover, even if an agency lawyer is convinced that her client
agency's policy choice threatens life or limb, the Model Rules
merely permit, but do not require, disclosure. 269 A few states have
made disclosure mandatory in narrow and exceptional
circumstances, but that is not the majority rule. 27 0 In other words,
exception (1) may allow some limited soft whistleblowing, but it
certainly does not encourage or require such conduct. Finally, the
Model Rules' commentary clarifies that with respect to
government lawyers, while the public interest may override
confidentiality responsibilities in certain cases of wrongdoing, the
lawyer must first refer the matter to the highest internal agency
authority. 271 "Public disclosure is only a last resort to avoid
Overall, therefore,
substantial harm to the organization."2 72
government lawyers are likely to be ethically leery of sharing their
agency client's confidences with congressional staff, journalists, or
outside watchdog groups.

269

Id. R. 1.6(b)(1).
Morse, supranote 27, at 436.

270

Id.

271

Id. at 438 (citing MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13 cmt. (4)).

272

Id.

268

(citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, § 67 cmt. (b)).
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Other agency professionals, by contrast, may feel quite
differently. For example, engineers' professional code of ethics
promotes disclosure in some circumstances.2 7 3 Specifically, the
National Society of Professional Engineers (NSPE) Code of Ethics
for Engineers states that "[e]ngineers shall hold paramount the
safety, health, and welfare of the public," and further, engineers
whose professional "judgment is overruled under circumstances
that endanger life or property.., shall notify their employer or
client and such other authority as may be appropriate.274 Note
three fundamental differences from the legal code of ethics: the
overall tone is quite permissive with respect to disclosure; there
are some circumstances in which an engineer is affirmatively
instructed, not merely allowed, to disclose; and the considerations
that can justify disclosure include potential harm to property, not
just to life or to limb. Thus, an engineer who finds herself in a
policy disagreement with superiors at her employer agency and
believes that her own approach to the problem would protect
public safety, health, or welfare better than her superiors'
approach, may feel herself entirely at liberty, and perhaps even
obligated, to discuss the disagreement with people outside her
agency.
The net result of this stark difference between legal and
engineering ethics is likely to be a shift of power toward engineers,
who one might expect to be more willing to use their inside
information to generate external pressure on their employer
agencies. This hypothesis, in turn, has at least two potential
consequences. First, soft whistleblowing may tend to disempower
lawyers within agencies, because their hands are tied in ways that
others' hands are not. 275 Second, a lawyer who wishes to create
outside pressure on her agency may choose to develop informationsharing relationships with others inside her agency, on whom she
relies-explicitly or implicitly-to pass her information out to
appropriate outsiders when the time is right. Thus, the fact of soft
273

DANIEL P.

WESTMAN

&

NANCY M.

MODESITT,

WHISTLEBLOWING:

THE LAW

OF

RETALIATORY DISCHARGE 35 (2d ed. 2004) (quoting NSPE, CODE OF ETHICS FOR ENGINEERS

II:I:A; III:2:B (2003)).
274 NSPE, CODE OF ETHICS FOR ENGINEERS II:l:A (2007) (emphasis added), available at
http://www.nspe.org/resources/pdfs/Ethics/CodeofEthics/Code-2007-July.pdf.
275 Cf. Magill & Vermeule, supra note 33, at 1046 (making a similar assertion about the
effects of the Chevron framework).
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whistleblowing may lead to the development of horizontal strategic
alliances among agency professionals whose differing professional
ethics differently constrain their contacts with outsiders.
Such horizontal alliances could, in turn, streamline agency
function. Gillian Metzger posits that stratification of agency
actors, including division of agency employees into distinct
organizational groups, serves as an internal check on activities of
the executive branch.2 7 6 Indeed, she argues that such "internal
separation of powers" mechanisms may serve as a greater check on
executive power than external oversight because internal forces
operate continuously during policy formulation, and therefore play
a more determinative, rather than reactionary, role. 277 Any
horizontal alliances forged as a result of soft whistleblowing,
however, would tend to reduce agency stratification, reducing the
effect of internal divisions.
B. IMPLICATIONS FOR OVERSIGHT

The case studies and interview results also suggest some
conclusions about effects on agency oversight. Many authors have
debated the relative efficacy and importance of oversight by
Congress, the President, the courts, and the public (or interest
groups).2 78 Others have identified the specific tools that such

276

Metzger, supranote 33, at 430.

277

Id. at 439-40.

278 See, e.g., Beermann, supra note 20, at 67 (emphasizing the importance of congressional
"oversight of and involvement in the administration of the laws"); Kagan, supra note 34, at

2252-55, 2347 (discussing the '"backdrop" of "congressional, expert, and [outside] interest
group control" of agencies, recounting "the emergence of increased presidential control," and
concluding by recognizing the importance of judicial review to prevent presidential
administration from "displac[ing] the preferences of a prior... Congress by interpreting
statutes inconsistently with their drafters' objectives"). Also relevant here are the many
papers considering the constitutional limits on Congress's "'power' to carve up the executive
department of the federal government into minifiefdoms independent of presidential
control." Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power to Execute
the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 544, 549 (1994) (arguing that the "Constitution allocates the
power of law execution and administration to the President alone," and evaluating "three
means available to the President for exercising control over the executive branch"). For the
other side of this debate, see generally, e.g., Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The
President and the Administration,94 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1994), and references cited therein.
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entities use to control agencies in particular contexts.27 9 Soft
whistleblowing has implications for all four sources of
accountability.
The net effect of soft whistleblowing is to
strengthen congressional control, and probably also judicial and
public oversight, at the expense of what has come to be known as
"presidential administration." 28 0
1. Congressional Oversight. Jack M. Beermann has identified
numerous formal and informal devices by which Congress controls
administration of the law. 28 1 Formal devices include laws "as
general as the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and as specific
as legislation enumerating with particularity the purposes for
which appropriated funds may or may not be spent."28 2 Informal
devices include "the threat of legislative action ...to control or at
least influence the administration of the law in myriad ways, from
insisting that the President appoint particular candidates for
executive positions to pushing administrative action in the
28 3
substantive direction favored by members of Congress."
As Beermann recognizes, ex parte communications between
members of Congress and agency insiders are one informal
mechanism by which Congress can exercise control over agency
policy formation. 28 4 For example, with very few limits, members of
Congress can offer an agency off-the-record comments on a
pending rule. These "comments are likely to be influential for all
the reasons that agencies fear acting contrary to the wishes of
those in Congress with power over their budgets and authorizing
28 5
statutes."
Beermann does not, however, make the converse point: soft
whistleblowing disclosures-off-the-record
and unsanctioned
communications in the opposite direction, from agency insiders to
congressional
staff-are
equally
important
to
targeted
279 See, e.g., Kathryn A. Watts, Regulatory Moratoria, 61 DUKE L.J. 1883, 1885 (2012)
(identifying regulatory moratoria as "a means through which executive and legislative
actors ... are either exerting or attempting to exert control over the administrative state").
280 See Kagan, supra note 34, at 2246 (defining "presidential administration" as
"exercising directive authority over.., agencies and asserting personal ownership of their
regulatory authority").
281 Beermann, supra note 20, at 68.
282

Id.

283

Id.

284

Id. at 130.
Id. at 134.

285
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congressional administration. Members of Congress can better
tailor oversight hearings, and better use the threat or reality of
legislative action, if their staff have advance warning about what
an agency plans to do, with which funds, for what reasons, and
with what degree of White House support.
Agency heads have every reason to share this kind of
information about policy development with Hill staff when they
anticipate that the developing policy will enjoy a positive reception
in Congress. Sometimes, though, an agency can anticipate a more
hostile reception. In that circumstance, the agency may try to
keep its work on the policy secret for as long as possible, both to
avoid having to mount an administratively-costly public defense of
the policy before its final contours are drawn, and also to limit the
time congressional opponents have to develop and push through
opposing legislation, such as (in the case of a new rule) a joint
2 86
resolution of disapproval under the Congressional Review Act.
Members of Congress and staff who wish to consider and
formulate responses to the developing policy must, therefore, rely
on whatever information they can glean from well-placed soft
whistleblowers in the target agency.
The evidence from interviews with congressional staffers is
quite suggestive on this count. Staff members indicated that soft
whistleblowing is most common when there is a divided
what one would expect if soft
government 28 7-precisely
whistleblowers who disagree with policy developments at their
employer agency in fact use their connections with congressional
staff on the other side of the aisle from the President to bolster
congressional opposition to those developments.
There is one important caveat to the argument that soft
whistleblowing enhances congressional oversight of agency action.
Soft whistleblowers may be able to jumpstart congressional action
with respect to a particular agency policy, but the resulting
congressional response may have a targeted, scorched-earth
quality, rather than the more objective and measured tone one
286 Congressional Review Act, Pub. L. No. 104-121, tit. II, subtit. E, 110 Stat. 868 (1996)
(codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 801-808 (2012)) (providing that Congress has sixty days within
which to review and disapprove a major new rule and easing the path by which disapproval
legislation could make it to the floor of the House and Senate during this review period).
287 See supra notes 201-12 and accompanying text.
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would hope to find in functional interbranch interactions. Every
agency policy has strengths and weaknesses, benefits and costs,
reasons to support it and reasons to oppose it. There is some risk
that a soft whistleblower, who at the very least opposes the agency
policy and may have additional and more personal bones to pick
with her employer agency, will pass on only the most incendiary
information about the agency's policy development processes. If
so, the congressional "oversight" generated on the soft
whistleblower's say-so may be biased and misdirected, though of
course the agency will have an opportunity to defend its policies in
any resulting hearings.
2. PresidentialAdministration. If soft whistleblowing does, in
fact, improve Congress's ability to tailor its oversight of agency
policy development, this raises an important corollary question:
Does Congress's increased control over agencies come at the
expense of presidential control? I believe so, for several reasons.
First, soft whistleblowing obviously gives a voice to those in the
executive branch who disagree with their agencies-or perhaps
with the White House itself.288 All three case studies illustrate
this point. Fuentes reached out to Betty Friedan and, later, NOW
because Fuentes disagreed with the EEOC's interpretation of Title
VII; the OSHA soft whistleblower disclosed the scientists'
memorandum because he or she disagreed with OSHA's decision
not to release the document, and also (presumably) with the
agency's decision not to tighten regulation of ethylene oxide; and
the NBPP soft whistleblowers talked to the press because they
disagreed with their agency's handling of the voter intimidation
lawsuits. In each case, the agency, and in turn the White House,
lost the ability to control both the development of the underlying
policy and the agency's public image.
As the NBPP story illustrates, the damage to a President, and
to the overall notion of presidential administration, can run deep.
The soft whistleblowers who informed the Washington Post that
"deep divisions" in the Voting Rights Section "persist today over
whether the agency should focus on protecting historically
288 But see BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 32-36
(Harvard Univ. Press 2010) (arguing that the increasingly politicized institutional
framework of the executive branch is making it less likely that internal actors will speak
out against executive policy).
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oppressed minorities or enforce laws without regard to race"28 9 left
lingering doubts in readers' minds, not just about the Voting
Rights Section's handling of the four voter-intimidation lawsuits,
but also about the Section's ability to do its work neutrally and
professionally, and about the Obama Administration's ability to
create a spirit of unity290 in the executive branch.
It is also possible that the damage a soft whistleblower can
cause to an administration's public image will have downstream
effects on the administration's approach to governance.
An
administration that has been tarnished on the Hill or in the press
thanks to the disclosures of a soft whistleblower may find itself
taking a slower, more cautious, and perhaps more conservative
approach in subsequent debates about related policies. And, as
every recent administration illustrates, it may attempt to crack
down on press and public access to agency personnel and
information. 291 There may also be personnel effects, if the
publicity is sufficiently negative that it encourages others at the
now-tarnished agency to leave their posts, or dissuades job
candidates from applying for open agency positions.
Further, soft whistleblowing plainly reduces a President's
ability to control the flow of information, both within and from the
executive branch.
Consider, for example, the Clinton-era
Executive Order, E.O. 12,866, which aimed to "reform and make
more efficient the regulatory process" by, among other things,

289 Markon & Thompson, supra note 141.
290 Cf. President Barack Obama, Weekly Address: Observes 9/11 with National Service
(Aug. 27, 2011), at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/08/27/weekly-addresscoming-together-remember (calling on Americans to return to the "spirit of unity" that
characterized the U.S. response to the September 11 terrorist attacks).
291 Cf. Carolyn Carlson, David Cuillier & Lindsey Tulkoff, Mediated Access: Journalists'
Perceptions of Federal Public Information Officer Media Control, SOC'Y OF PROF'L
JOURNALISTS, Mar. 12, 2012, http://spj.org/pdf/reporters-survey-on-federal-PAOs.pdf
(surveying "146 reporters who cover federal agencies," and concluding that "public
information officers often require pre-approval for interviews" or "monitor interviews");
Heidi Kitrosser, Scientific Integrity: The Perilsand Promise of White House Administration,
79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2395, 2415 & n.122 (2011) (noting that some agencies in the Obama
Administration "require scientists to pre-clear even unofficial public communications
relevant to their work with public affairs officers"); Interview with Anonymous
Congressional Staffer
1, supra note 201 (indicating that the Obama White House
maintains a restricted list of which agency personnel are allowed to attend meetings with
outside groups, including congressional staff); ABEL, supra note 29, at 41-42 (discussing
similar measures taken by President Reagan).
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"enhanc[ing] planning and coordination with respect to both new
and existing regulations," and "mak[ing] the [regulatory] process
more accessible and open to the public.2 92 According to thenProfessor Elena Kagan:
Perhaps the most heralded changes [in E.O. 12,866]
related to ex parte contacts and disclosure issues.
Under the order, only the Administrator of [the White
House Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs
(OIRA)] could receive oral communications from
persons outside the executive branch .... The order
further required OIRA to forward to the relevant
agency all written communications from outsiders and
to maintain a log, available to the public, of both
written and oral communications involving these
parties. And after publication of the regulatory action
(or a decision not to go forward with it), OIRA was
required to disclose all written communications
between itself and the agency. Taken together, these
provisions substantially opened the review process to
293
public view and comment.
Soft whistleblowing thoroughly undermines regulatory reform
efforts of this sort, because it involves unsanctioned, off-the-record
information exchange between agency insiders and interested
outsiders, with no centralized White House or OIRA oversight.
Thus, soft whistleblowing deprives the White House of the ability
either to control the subject matter of off-the-record
communications with outsiders, or to mandate disclosure of such
In other words, soft whistleblowing can
communications.
hamstring a President's efforts to centralize on- and off-the-record
communications between the executive branch and outsiders. In
turn, the White House loses the ability to limit agency capture and
increase accountability by publicizing any communications
between particular interest groups and the agency.

Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (1993), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C.
§ 601 app. at 802 (2012).
293 Kagan, supra note 34, at 2286-87.
292
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There is at least one other way in which soft whistleblowers can
affect presidential administration, though it is difficult to say
whether the net effect is to strengthen or weaken presidential
control. As noted above, soft whistleblowers regularly disclose
presidential or OMB influence over policy developments at their
employer agencies. 294 The result, of course, is to limit the
President's ability to blame an agency for unpopular policies that
in fact originated in the White House. This seems, at least
superficially, to weaken presidential control; the flip side is that
the exposure serves in part to legitimize the President's
involvement, because thanks to the soft whistleblower, the public
can accurately attribute the policy to the current administration
and vote accordingly.
3. Judicial Review. Soft whistleblowers also affect judicial
oversight of agency action, as is evident from the OSHA/ethylene
oxide example, in which one or more whistleblowers twice provided
Public Citizen with information critical to its ongoing litigation
295
against OSHA.
Whether the consequence of such litigation-relevant leaks is to
improve judicial review depends, in part, on one's definition of the
goal. On the one hand, one might assume that a court is likely to
reach a fairer and more accurate assessment of the lawfulness of a
particular agency action if the court has access to the full record of
the agency's decisionmaking process. 296 In that case, a well-placed
soft whistleblower who passes information, insights, and perhaps
even decisional documents to outside litigants helps bring us closer
to that goal. Likewise, such a source may also be in a position to
expose any White House influence over the shape of the final
agency policy, thereby squarely presenting to the court the issue of
whether to defer to a policy produced not by the supposedly expert
297
agency, but instead by the overtly political White House.

See supra notes 127-30 and accompanying text.
295 See supra notes 109-12, 118-19 and accompanying text.
296 Coming full circle, the litigation may ultimately affect the policy goals that first
motivated the soft whistleblower to make her disclosures. Cf. Ingber, supra note 33, at 378
(arguing that defensive litigation can prompt policy change or "force the executive branch to
crystallize" its public stance on existing policy).
297 See supra note 130 for articles on the merits of deferring to a rule or policy that was
developed with heavy White House influence.
294
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On the other hand, there are also reasons to be concerned about
soft whistleblowers' passing information, including privileged
documents, to the opposing party in ongoing litigation against
their employer agencies. Rampant soft whistleblowing of this sort
may chill thorough discussion of alternative policy approaches,
because everyone inside the agency might become concerned about
expressing unpopular or controversial views lest those views be
disclosed to outsiders. 298 "Human experience teaches that those
who expect public dissemination of their remarks may well temper
candor with a concern for appearances ...to the detriment of the

decisionmaking process."299
Worse yet, our judicial review system is ill-designed to discover
this kind of flaw in an agency's decisionmaking. Whatever the
standard of review in a particular case, courts basically review an
agency's action for reasonableness, 00 and agency action appears
more reasonable when there are few voices of dissent in the
rulemaking record. Thus, the long-term effect of prolific soft
whistleblowing may not be to shore up judicial review of agency
action, but instead to chill dissent inside the agency, making what
might otherwise have been divisive, hard-fought, and judicially
vulnerable agency decisions appear unanimous and, consequently,
reasonable.
Then, too, there is a risk that soft whistleblowing could drive,
and perhaps skew, the litigation agendas for outside groups that
regularly challenge agency action. Suppose, for example, Public
Citizen developed a long term and mutually beneficial relationship
with the OSHA/ethylene oxide soft whistleblower(s). If Public
Citizen began to premise much of its OSHA-related litigation
agenda on that soft whistleblower's information, the soft
whistleblower could effectively use Public Citizen as a mouthpiece
for his or her concerns about OSHA-perhaps co-opting a broader
298 As the Supreme Court has recognized, the purpose of FOIA's deliberative process
privilege, which protects decisional documents, "is that the 'frank discussion of legal or
policy matters' in writing might be inhibited if the discussion were made public; and that
the 'decisions' and 'policies formulated' would be the poorer as a result." NLRB v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 150 (1975) (quoting S. Rep. No. 813, at 9).
299 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705 (1974).
- David Zaring, Rule by Reasonableness,63 ADMIN. L. REV. 525, 530 (2011) (arguing that
courts "are increasingly sneaking reasonableness standards into their reviews in lieu of
making the difficult distinctions required by contemporary standard of review doctrine").
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and more considered litigation agenda in favor of the soft
In the face of such a threat, the
whistleblower's concerns.
continued efficacy of judicial review of agency action depends in
part on outside litigants' exercising independent judgment about
whether particular agency transgressions, identified by soft
whistleblowers, are worthy of pursuit in court.
Overall, therefore, it is difficult to say whether soft
whistleblowers serve to enhance or undermine judicial review of
agency action. In the OSHA case, one can argue that the
disclosure of the OSHA scientists' memorandum led to a sounder
outcome-the agency indeed acted arbitrarily when it ignored the
advice of its top scientists in refusing to strengthen the ethylene
oxide standard. But for the reasons noted above, the long-term
effect of significant soft whistleblowing at a particular agency may
be to undermine the agency's decisionmaking, and to do so in ways
that subsequent judicial review cannot discern and correct.
4. Democratic Accountability. Related to the issue of judicial
review is the question of public or interest group accountabilitywhat does soft whistleblowing mean for an agency's public image,
and for interest groups' ability to participate in agency
decisionmaking and to challenge agency decisions in court?
To begin with, it is important to note that soft whistleblowing
can catalyze the formation of outside interest groups, as the
feminist underground catalyzed formation of NOW. After its
founding, NOW waged a very public campaign to push the EEOC
30 1
and other federal agencies to expand their reading of Title VII.
And, as documented above, Fuentes and her fellow soft
whistleblowers assisted in that campaign. 30 2 It is clear, therefore,
that soft whistleblowers can expose agencies to new avenues of
accountability.
But what of the information that soft whistleblowers provide?
Simplistically, one might assume that all information that leaks
from agencies promotes transparency and, in turn, democratic
accountability. After all, as President Obama reminded us shortly
after his inauguration, "[i]nformation maintained by the Federal
Government is a national asset," and "[t]ransparency promotes
301 Highlights from NOW's Forty Fearless Years, NOW, http://www.now.orgfhistory/
timeline.htm1 (last visited Feb. 3, 2014).
302 See discussion supra Part III.A.
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accountability and provides information for citizens about what
30 3
their Government is doing."
Further, one might view soft whistleblowing as part of the
solution to problems of agency capture. As noted earlier 304 that
term is a shorthand for the oft-expressed concern that "wellorganized groups ha[ve] the potential to exercise disproportionate
influence over agency policymaking by virtue of the resources they
command[], the information they possess[], and the long-term
relations they maintain[] with agency officials."30 5 Perhaps soft
whistleblowers help to correct that imbalance by providing
information, expertise, and access to smaller or less well-organized
groups.
Both arguments, however, rely on contestable premises. First,
they presuppose that the soft whistleblowers are neutral and evenhanded in the information they choose to disclose and the manner
in which they disclose it. If, instead, a soft whistleblower has a
political agenda, or a personal axe to grind with her employer
agency,
the picture the soft whistleblower paints of
decisionmaking activities at that agency may not be fair and
accurate-and thus the agency may be called to account for
activities or decisions that would appear entirely reasonable in a
fairer light.
Second, the idea that soft whistleblowing can help to correct
information imbalances, and thus reduce agency capture, relies on
the notion that soft whistleblowers, as a group, are equally or more
likely to disclose their information to smaller, informationchallenged outside entities as they are to the larger, betterorganized groups that are routinely suspected of engaging in
capture. In fact, the opposite is far more likely. Both the stories
and my interviews suggest that soft whistleblowers generally
share their information with individuals or entities with whom
they have a prior connection. As a result, the same groups that
"ha[ve] the potential to exercise disproportionate influence over
agency policymaking by virtue of... the long-term relations they

303Memorandum on Transparency and Open Government to the Heads of Executive
Departments and Agencies, 74 Fed. Reg. 15,4685 (Jan. 21, 2009).
304 See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
305Kagan, supra note 34, at 2265.
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maintain[] with agency officials,"'30 6 are also likely to have
stronger ties to soft whistleblowers. Moreover, as noted above, soft
whistleblowers may undermine White House efforts, like that
embodied in E.O. 12,866, to limit capture and increase
administrative accountability by centralizing and publicizing ex
parte communications with outside interest groups. 30 7 In short,
the consequences of soft whistleblowing for "interest group
control"30 8 depend closely on the nature, scope, and directionality
of this kind of information flow.
C. FURTHER QUESTIONS

The above discussion offers testable hypotheses about the
consequences of soft whistleblowing for agency governance, policy
development, and oversight. Several additional questions about
For example, the
the phenomenon also merit mention.
interviewees indicated that soft whistleblowing occurs not only
between agency insiders and outside entities, but also between
If those
agencies-that is, within the executive branch.
communications are common, they have significant implications
for coordination of policymaking efforts among agencies that share
regulatory authority in particular areas. 30 9 Another important
question is whether soft whistleblowing is directional-that is,
whether the information flows more abundantly to groups on one
side of the political aisle, or on one side of particular policy issues,
than to those on other sides.
Other questions concern appropriate organizational responses
to soft whistleblowing. Many entities behave in ways that suggest
they recognize the advantages and risks of this kind of off-therecord information exchange. For example, incoming presidents
often implement policies to limit unsanctioned leaks in an attempt
to ensure that staff participate only in approved off-the-record

306

Id.

See supra notes 292-94 and accompanying text (discussing how soft whistleblowing
undermines regulatory reform efforts).
308 Kagan, supra note 34, at 2264.
3N Cf. Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordinationin Shared Regulatory Space, 125
HARv. L. REV. 1131, 1135 (2012) (discussing the redundancies, inefficiencies, gaps, and
coordination challenges that arise when two or more agencies share regulatory authority
307

over a policy area).
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conversations with outsiders. 310 Outgoing administrations, for
their part, may "engage in significant personnel entrenchment,"
moving political appointees to "civil service position[s] with tenure
in the same agency."311 One goal of these personnel shifts may be
to "ensur[e] that the outgoing administration's viewpoints and
priorities remain represented within the agency,"3 12 but a
significant additional benefit is that outgoing political personnel
who are returning to jobs in the private sector will continue to
have close contacts in government. Relatedly, lobbying firms and
agency watchdog groups frequently hire former agency employees,
no doubt in part because a former insider is likely to have personal
connections to-and contact information for-staff who remain at
the agency. These and other tactical moves may be important to
control the flow of nonpublic information from agencies, and to
increase outside entities' ability to recognize whether the
information coming from particular soft whistleblowers is sound
and reliable.
V. CONCLUSION

The existence of off-the-record information exchange between
agency employees and interested groups outside the agency is
neither new nor surprising. This Article has attempted to expand
and add nuance to our understanding of that information
exchange, however, by documenting (1) that a significant amount
of the information flows outward, from agency employees to Hill
staff, journalists, and agency watchdog groups, (2) that the
outward flow often relates to issues of policy rather than agency
malfeasance, and (3) that agency employees strategically leak
information in this way, in an effort to create outside pressure on
their agency to shift its policymaking direction.
I have suggested a name for these policy-relevant disclosures by
agency employees-soft whistleblowing. Further, I have offered
three histories and a series of interviews to demonstrate that soft

310 See supra note 291 and accompanying text (discussing various methods presidents
have utilized to restrict agency personnel access to outside groups).
311 Nina A. Mendelson, Agency Burrowing: Entrenching Policies and PersonnelBefore a
New PresidentArrives, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 557, 563 (2003).
312

Id. at 564.
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whistleblowing is real and common. This evidence paints a picture
of the phenomenon and supports my argument that the resulting
high-volume, employee-directed flow of information out of agencies
has significant effects on agency structure and function, and on
outside entities' ability to oversee agency policymaking and limit
agency overreach.
On a more theoretical level, soft whistleblowing likely serves a
steadying, course-corrective function, insulating agencies from
shifting political winds.
Further, the phenomenon may
disempower agency lawyers relative to other agency professionals,
such as engineers, because differences in professional ethics rules
may render the latter more willing to use their expertise and
inside information to manipulate outside oversight of their
agencies.
Finally, I have argued that soft whistleblowing assists Congress
in tailoring its oversight of agency action. The phenomenon may
also enhance both judicial review of agency action and public
accountability, though the evidence on these points is more mixed.
In any case, the strengthening of congressional oversight likely
comes at the expense of presidential administration, because soft
whistleblowing gives voice to those in an agency who disagree with
their agency superiors or with the White House.
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